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ABSTRACT
Law enforcement agencies are increasingly turning to genetic
databases as a way of solving crime, either through requesting the DNA
profile of an identified suspect from a database or, more commonly, by
matching crime scene DNA with DNA profiles in a database in an
attempt to identify a suspect or a family member of a suspect. Neither
of these efforts implicates the Fourth Amendment, because the
Supreme Court has held that a Fourth Amendment “search” does not
occur unless police infringe “expectations of privacy society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable” and has construed that phrase narrowly,
without reference to society’s actual views. The empirical study
presented in this Article, which attempts to gauge societal privacy
expectations in this terrain, suggests that laypeople consider law
enforcement access to genetic information to be as intrusive as, or more
intrusive than, searches of bedrooms, text messages, or emails, not only
when one’s DNA is held by health care providers, but also when it is
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obtained from direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies and public
genealogy websites. Our research also suggests that the location of
genetic information—rather than its nature, the purpose for which it is
acquired, or the extent to which its surrender was voluntary—is the
primary driver of these intrusiveness perceptions. Based on this
research, we argue that both police access to non-governmental genetic
databases and police use of covert methods to collect DNA in the hope
of matching crime scene DNA require judicial authorization, although
not necessarily a traditional warrant. More broadly, we argue that
empirical data about the public’s privacy concerns surrounding law
enforcement’s collection of and access to genetic data should be an
integral consideration in judicial determinations of how these activities
should be regulated by the Constitution.
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Can the government . . . secure your DNA from 23andMe without a
warrant or probable cause? Smith and Miller say yes it can—at least
without running afoul of Katz. But that result strikes most lawyers and
judges today—me included—as pretty unlikely. In the years since its
adoption, countless scholars, too, have come to conclude that the
“third-party doctrine is not only wrong, but horribly wrong.” . . .
People often do reasonably expect that information they entrust to third
parties, especially information subject to confidentiality agreements,
will be kept private.
—Justice Neil Gorsuch1

INTRODUCTION
The governor of the state is brutally murdered, and the police are
desperate to solve the crime.2 They have crime scene DNA which they
are very sure belongs to the perpetrator. Unable to develop any leads
through traditional police work or other forensic analysis, government
agents run the sample through the state DNA database of everyone
who has been arrested in the state, as well as through the Combined
DNA Index System (“CODIS”), the federal DNA database that

1. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–63 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(quoting Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 U. MICH. L. REV. 561, 564
(2009) (footnote omitted)).
2. While this crime is hypothetical, the following actions taken by the police to solve the
crime are based on real events.
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contains the DNA of arrested and convicted individuals.3 But they fail
to get a match, despite the fact that CODIS alone houses over 19
million DNA profiles.4
The police then go to GEDmatch, a publicly accessible DNA
database containing over 1 million profiles that have been generated
elsewhere, submitted by people hoping to find relatives or learn more
about their family trees.5 Posing as one of those people, the police seek
a match from this second source,6 but again are unsuccessful. Police
then proceed to Ancestry.com and 23andMe, commonly known as
“direct-to-consumer genetic testing” (“DTC-GT”) companies, which
together contain over 26 million DNA profiles of consumers who have
provided them with saliva or some other physical sample in the hope
of finding relatives or discovering their health proclivities;7 the agents
ask both companies to see if they can come up with a match, even
offering to pay for the service. The companies refuse, so the police
obtain a subpoena from a judge, after she concludes that the DNA
information “is relevant to an ongoing investigation.”8 The companies
comply with the subpoena.9 But, again, no match.

3. CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/
services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics [https://perma.cc/77FJ-TMFR].
4. Id.
5. Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile Is Private? A Florida Judge Just
Said Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://nyti.ms/33lqoKi [https://perma.cc/KHY6GNQZ]; see also Tools for DNA and Genealogy Research, GEDMATCH, https://
www.gedmatch.com [https://perma.cc/R9RE-N8CY].
6. Tim Arango, Adam Goldman & Thomas Fuller, To Catch a Killer: A Fake Profile on a
DNA Site and a Pristine Sample, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Kn641M [https://
perma.cc/M9CK-HY78]; see also Abigail Abrams, How Did They Catch the Golden State Killer?
An Online DNA Service and His Genetic Relatives Revealed the Suspect, TIME (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://time.com/5256835 [https://perma.cc/2SP5-S4HK]; Antonio Regalado, Hundreds of Crimes
Will Soon Be Solved Using DNA Databases, Genealogist Predicts, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/09/13/140207 [https://perma.cc/WLR4-LF6U].
7. Antonio Regalado, More Than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test,
MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/11/103446 [https://
perma.cc/D4GM-RS9T].
8. Paul Elias, Law Enforcement Investigators Seek Out Private DNA Databases, AP NEWS
(Mar. 26, 2016), https://apnews.com/e32f553002594ecfa5e83c160b4ba720 [https://perma.cc/
EC7R-YDKJ].
9. Id. (“Ancestry and 23and[M]e each said they turn over customer genetic data only under
court order.”). But see id. (“23and[M]e privacy officer Kate Black . . . said that the company has
never turned over genetic information despite receiving four court orders . . . [by] convinc[ing]
investigators that the company’s data won’t help with their cases . . . .”).
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Finally, the police contact the administrators of the All of Us
(“AoU”) Research Program, a federally funded research database that
contains the genetic information of hundreds of thousands of people
who agreed to submit their DNA and medical records for the purpose
of furthering research into genetic predispositions, especially those
related to health and disease.10 The administrators refuse access,
pointing to a Certificate of Confidentiality11 (“CoC”) issued by the
federal government. Police seek a court order to override the
certificate and force the administrators to cooperate, based on the
seriousness of the crime and the assertion that all other investigative
avenues have been exhausted. But while the prosecution litigates the
court order,12 police find an easier target—a public research database
created by citizen scientists that is not shielded by a CoC. Through this
source, the government finally obtains a match, but it is only partial,
meaning that it is the profile of a person related to the suspected
perpetrator.
The police are undaunted, because this “familial matching”
process leads them to four relatives of the partial match whose
whereabouts at the time of the crime and other characteristics make
them persons of interest. The police surreptitiously collect the DNA of
three of these relatives from used coffee cups and other discarded
items. Unfortunately, none is an exact match. And they are frustrated
in their attempts to obtain the DNA of the fourth person, because he
is extremely careful about leaving behind items that might harbor
traces of his DNA. So, they subpoena his medical records and find his

10. As of May 2020, the program touted nearly 350,000 participants “and counting.” Josh
Denny, All of Us Research Program Begins Beta Testing of Data Platform, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH ALL OF US RSCH. PROGRAM (May 27, 2020), https://allofus.nih.gov/news-events-andmedia/announcements/all-us-research-program-begins-beta-testing-data-platform [https://perma.cc/
ZCN7-7SLQ].
11. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)(E) (2018) (“Identifiable, sensitive information protected under [a
Certificate] . . . shall be immune from the legal process, and shall not . . . be admissible as evidence
or used for any purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial, legislative, or administrative
proceeding.”); Certificates of Confidentiality (CoC) - Human Subjects, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
https://grants.nih.gov/policy/humansubjects/coc.htm [https://perma.cc/83FB-LYKS].
12. See State v. Bradley, 634 S.E.2d 258, 262 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing a CoC
holder’s right to appeal from a trial court’s order to disclose information protected under a CoC).
CoCs have since been augmented by the 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat.
1033 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), but these new protections
remain largely untested in the courts, see Leslie E. Wolf & Laura M. Beskow, Genomic Databases,
Subpoenas, and Certificates of Confidentiality, 21 GENETICS IN MED. 2681, 2681 (2019)
(explaining that “there is a paucity of legal cases establishing the[] effectiveness” of CoCs).
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genetic profile,13 which (finally!) is an exact match with the crime scene
DNA.
Police actions like those described in this hypothetical have all
happened, although not all in one case.14 Since DNA evidence was first
successfully used in a U.S. court proceeding in 1987,15 DNA has
become a powerful crime-solving tool for law enforcement, a
development driven by the vast amount of genetic data now housed in
government-run, public, and private databases, and the emergence of
new techniques to exploit these resources. Today, not only have
government-run databases containing profiles of convicted and
arrested individuals expanded exponentially, but massive amounts of
genetic information are also held by third parties: genetic testing has
become commonplace in the health care setting; multiple large-scale
precision medicine initiatives are currently underway in the United
States; millions of Americans have undergone testing with DTC-GT
companies; and several million more have submitted raw genetic data
they have received from DTC-GT companies or elsewhere to thirdparty interpretation services and open-access databases seeking
genealogical and other information.16
The genetic information housed in these public and private
databases is an increasingly valuable target for law enforcement; if
their contents were combined, these databases would soon—and may
already—provide police with direct or familial genetic leads to

13. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2020) (authorizing certain disclosures of protected health
information for “law enforcement purposes”).
14. See supra notes 3–13. To our knowledge, All of Us has never subpoenaed in a criminal
case, but another research-based entity has been. See State v. Bradley, 634 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006).
15. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (“We have found no
other appellate decision addressing the admissibility of DNA identification evidence in criminal
cases.”), abrogated by Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d. 188 (Fla. 1989), abrogated by In re Amendments
to the Fla. Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2019) (per curiam).
16. See Tia Moscarello, Brittney Murray, Chloe M. Reuter & Erin Demo, Direct-toConsumer Raw Genetic Data and Third-Party Interpretation Services: More Burden Than
Bargain?, 21 GENETICS IN MED. 539, 539 (2019) (“Up to 62% of consumers use third-party
applications to interpret the raw data and health information not included in companies’
reports.”); Catharine Wang, Tiernan J. Cahill, Andrew Parlato, Blake Wertz, Qiankun Zhong,
Tricia Norkunas Cunningham & James J. Cummings, Consumer Use and Response to Online
Third-Party Raw DNA Interpretation Services, 6 MOLECULAR GENETICS & GENOMIC MED. 35,
36 (2018) (reporting that 67% of 478 surveyed individuals used a third-party service to interpret
raw DNA information).
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everyone in the United States.17 This potential has heightened worries
about government overreach during forensic investigations, but may
also affect the public’s willingness to undergo testing in a health care
setting or to participate in research.18 This, in turn, may exacerbate
existing health disparities and stifle scientific progress, given that fear
of governmental access to personal and family genetic information is
likely to be most pronounced amongst populations that have been
historically underrepresented in research datasets.19
Despite these concerns, neither the collection of genetic samples
nor its analysis and use by law enforcement has been subject to
significant regulation. In Maryland v. King,20 the Supreme Court held
that the government may collect DNA samples from arrestees using a
buccal (cheek) swab, at least when the suspected crime is serious.21
Several states have assumed that the latter limitation will soon fall by
the wayside and have enacted laws that mandate collection for a
number of enumerated misdemeanors as well.22 The result is that law
enforcement agencies can access their own databases containing a huge
number of DNA profiles, virtually at will, as long as their purpose is to
identify a suspect in a criminal investigation. And neither federal nor
state law has much to say about police use of DNA collected by public

17. See Yaniv Erlich, Tal Shor, Itsik Pe’er & Shai Carmi, Identity Inference of Genomic Data
Using Long-Range Familial Searches, 362 SCI. 690, 690 (2018) (“[A] genetic database needs to
cover only 2% of the target population to provide a third-cousin match to nearly any person.”
(citation omitted)).
18. See Ellen W. Clayton, Colin M. Halverson, Nila A. Sathe & Bradley A. Malin, A
Systematic Literature Review of Individuals’ Perspectives on Privacy and Genetic Information in
the United States, PLOS ONE 10–11 (Oct. 31, 2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/
file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0204417&type=printable [https://perma.cc/B9TJ-7NSR] (cataloging
studies indicating concern about governmental access to genetic information and noting that
“worries about privacy led [some] people to decide not to participate in research”).
19. See id. at 12–13 (“In almost all studies reporting differences in perspectives by race or
ethnicity, non-White individuals had greater concerns about privacy . . . .”); see also Latrice G.
Landry, Nadya Ali, David R. Williams, Heidi L. Rehm & Vence L. Bonham, Lack of Diversity in
Genomic Databases Is a Barrier to Translating Precision Medicine Research into Practice, 37
HEALTH AFFS. 780, 782 (2018) (recognizing a “reasonable genetic representation of individuals
of European ancestry in databases but poorer representation of other ethnic populations”).
20. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
21. Id. at 456–66.
22. See DNA Arrestee Laws, NAT’ L CONF. S TATE L EGISLATURES (2013), http://
www.ncsl.org/Documents/cj/ArresteeDNALaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HWL-FRXX] (reporting
that several states collect DNA from individuals arrested for enumerated misdemeanors,
including Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
South Dakota).
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and DTC-GT companies, which is regulated almost entirely by
contract between the consumer and the company.23 The Food and
Drug Administration has put some limits on the types of health-related
tests these companies can market,24 and the Federal Trade Commission
has issued recommended guidelines regarding their privacy policies.25
But the statutes regulating law enforcement access to their data appear
to require, at most, only a subpoena to obtain DNA.26 Data collected
for federally funded genetic research are subject to much tighter
confidentiality rules, but even here a court order short of a warrant
might suffice.27
As Justice Gorsuch suggested in the passage quoted at the
beginning of this Article, however, all of this may be in flux. The
elephant in the room is the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures and requires a warrant based on
probable cause for searches of the “persons, houses, papers, and
effects” of people suspected of ordinary crime.28 Justice Gorsuch
suggests, and we agree, that this language should impose serious
constraints on many types of genetic forensic investigations.29
Admittedly, as of right now, a significant amount of Supreme
Court precedent stands in the way of those of us espousing this view.
Although King held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the
government collects a DNA sample from an individual,30 it also

23. These contracts generally take the form of “a Privacy Policy (PP) or Terms of Service
(ToS) document.” James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A
Survey of the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies,
28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 47–57 (2018) (describing the ease with which these documents
can be changed); see also Andelka M. Phillips, Reading the Fine Print When Buying Your Genetic
Self Online: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Terms and Conditions, 36 NEW GENETICS &
SOC’Y 273, 281–89 (2017) (describing common policy and contract provisions among DTC-GT
companies).
24. Patricia J. Zettler, Jacob S. Sherkow & Henry T. Greely, 23andMe, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the Future of Genetic Testing, 174 JAMA INTERN. MED. 493, 493–94 (2014).
25. Elisa Jillson, Selling Genetic Testing Kits? Read On, FTC (Mar. 2019), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/03/selling-genetic-testing-kits-read [https://
perma.cc/GAZ7-WT8B].
26. See infra text accompanying notes 154–157 (describing HIPAA regulations permitting
even medical records to be accessed with a subpoena).
27. See Wolf & Beskow supra note 12 (describing the paucity of regulation in this area).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–63 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
30. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013) (“It can be agreed that using a buccal swab
on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”).
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concluded that if the individual is an arrestee taken into custody or a
convicted individual, the search is reasonable even without a search
warrant or any level of probable cause; according to the Court, these
individuals have virtually no expectation of privacy in light of their
incarcerated status and the minimal intrusion of a swab.31 And if a
private or public company collects DNA, the Fourth Amendment is
not implicated at all, because no government action is involved.32
Even when the government seeks access to the DNA collected by
these companies in the ways highlighted by our hypothetical, the
Fourth Amendment remains irrelevant. One could argue that, in
contrast to the circumstances in King, the DNA obtained from private
companies comes from individuals whose privacy is not diminished by
virtue of being incarcerated and thus that the Fourth Amendment
should apply with full force. However, under the Court’s current
precedent, the stronger argument is that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated by such access, because the government’s effort is not a
“search”—a word the Supreme Court has long defined, since the 1967
decision of Katz v. United States,33 in terms of whether the government
action infringes an expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”34 Under that formulation, the Supreme
Court has held that people who voluntarily surrender information to a
third party, even very private information, assume the risk the third
party will turn it over to the government. Thus, any expectation of
privacy a party may have in the surrendered information is
unreasonable, even if there is an agreement with the third party that
the information will be used for a specific, non-law enforcement
purpose.35 This body of law—dubbed the “third-party doctrine”—
would seem to permit warrantless police access to DNA from a thirdparty database.
Signs of change are in the air, however. In the past decade, the
Court has significantly tempered its views on the scope of the Fourth

31. See id. at 463 (“Once an individual has been arrested on probable cause for a dangerous
offense that may require detention before trial, however, his or her expectations of privacy and
freedom from police scrutiny are reduced.”). But see id. (“This is not to suggest that any search is
acceptable solely because a person is in custody.”).
32. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (establishing that only searches and
seizures carried out by government officials implicate the Fourth Amendment).
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. See infra Part I.A.2.
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Amendment. In 2012, the Supreme Court indicated it might be willing
to backtrack on the third-party doctrine in a case involving real-time
technological tracking,36 and, in 2018, in Carpenter v. United States,37 it
explicitly did so, by holding that police need a warrant to obtain cellsite location information from a third-party carrier.38 So, there is now
room to argue that the same rule should apply to police attempts to
obtain DNA from a third party, at least under some circumstances. The
key question then becomes, under what circumstances, precisely?
In this Article, we argue that this question cannot be answered
simply with armchair philosophizing. Rather, it requires, as the Court’s
case law seems to suggest, some sense of the expectations of privacy
that are actually “recognized by society.” One possible reference point
is positive law.39 But sole reliance on that source is problematic for a
number of reasons.40 As one of us has argued in previous scholarship,
privacy is a “normative” concept in the social science meaning of that
word.41 Its scope largely depends on societal views, not on what judges
might surmise from the bench or on what legislatures, driven by

36. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that planting a GPS device
on a car is a trespass that triggers Fourth Amendment protection, even if it only tracks travel in
public that is also observable by third parties).
37. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
38. Id. at 2223.
39. See, e.g., id. at 2268, 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[A]ncient principles [of bailment]
may help us address modern data cases . . . .”); William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive
Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2016) (“Fourth
Amendment protection should depend on property law, privacy torts, consumer laws,
eavesdropping and wiretapping legislation, anti-stalking statutes, and other provisions of law
generally applicable to private actors . . . .”); Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the
Warren Court Dismantled the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 33, 72 (2005)
(arguing for a Fourth Amendment “rooted in property theories”).
40. See generally Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313 (2016)
(arguing that “government action is fundamentally different — and often more deserving of
regulation — than similar conduct by private parties,” and thus that privacy-related measures
applicable to private parties should at most establish a “floor” for Fourth Amendment protection,
not a ceiling); Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the Central Value Protected by the
Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 143 (2015)
(responding to arguments that, instead of focusing on privacy, Fourth Amendment protections
should protect property, dignity, intimate relationships, autonomy, and security, among other
values).
41. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 113–16 (2007) (“[W]hen privacy ‘is understood as a form of
dignity, there can ultimately be no other measure of privacy than the social norms that actually
exist in our civilization’” (quoting Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087,
2094 (2001))).
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numerous diverging agendas, might enact. Until the Court changes its
Fourth Amendment focus from privacy to something else, actual
societal expectations of privacy should be highly relevant to the
analysis.
In an effort to find out what society thinks about the privacy
interests implicated by our hypothetical (but still real-world) situation,
we recruited 1,597 participants using an online survey platform and
presented them with 21 short scenarios. Some scenarios involved
government efforts to obtain genetic information and some described
government attempts to garner other types of sensitive personal
information, such as medical records, text messages, web-browsing
history, and similar items. The scenarios were designed to reflect
current or emerging ways in which law enforcement might try to obtain
genetic and nongenetic evidence, with several based on Supreme Court
precedent. Participants were asked to rank each scenario on a 100point scale ranging from “not intrusive at all” to “extremely intrusive,”
and then asked to indicate whether the scenario described a situation
in which a person was entitled to a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
To gain a more nuanced perspective of the participants’ views on
privacy, we employed five variations of our survey. In the additional
variations, scenarios remained largely unchanged but were presented
either in the first person or with additional information or assumptions
surrounding the search.
The collective goal of these surveys was to gauge public attitudes
toward different types of genetic investigations, both compared to each
other and compared to other types of investigations. For example, do
individuals perceive law enforcement efforts to obtain genetic data
from DTC-GT companies to be as intrusive as efforts to obtain the
same information from their doctor? How does the perceived
intrusiveness of these types of actions compare to the perceived
intrusiveness of searches of bedrooms or pat downs of one’s clothing
during a stop and frisk? And in any of these contexts, are privacy
interests perceived as diminished when people are provided additional
context about the purpose of the police search—for example, to solve
or prevent a serious crime—or told that the search yielded evidence of
a crime?
In this Article, we attempt to obtain preliminary answers to these
questions with the aim of informing debates about the appropriate
level of regulation for genetic investigations, particularly as a matter of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part I discusses the evolving legal
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framework that governs searches involving genetic information and
surveys the current and emerging ways in which law enforcement might
utilize the information gleaned from such searches. Part II describes
the survey methodology used in our study, the results of which are
described in Part III. The Article concludes in Part IV with a discussion
of the findings of the study and its implications for the Fourth
Amendment third-party doctrine and genetic privacy more broadly.
There are several takeaways from our research. First, our subjects
make significant distinctions among different types of genetic
investigations, particularly between those using government-run
databases on the one hand, and those using private databases (such as
23andMe) and public databases (such as GEDmatch) on the other.
Second, even when such investigations involve obtaining DNA from a
third party, our subjects often perceived them to be as intrusive as, or
more intrusive than, many traditional police actions that the Supreme
Court has established are Fourth Amendment searches subject to the
warrant and probable cause requirements.
Third, contrary to the Court’s reliance on guesses about when
information is “voluntarily shared” with a third party, and contrary to
much of the academic literature on how expectations of privacy should
be assessed,42 our subjects appeared to focus on the location of the
information, not its provenance or content. At least when genetic data
are the target, its location—for example, whether it is in an electronic
medical record in a doctor’s computer, a public database, or a
government-run database—is the primary determinant of privacy
expectations. That conclusion has interesting implications for the
application of Fourth Amendment doctrine to investigations involving
genetic information, at least to the extent that the doctrine is based on
expectations of privacy that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.
Specifically, it would support an argument in favor of judicial
authorization both when police access nongovernmental genetic
databases and when police collect DNA from individuals who have not
yet been arrested. But the type of authorization might vary
significantly, depending on the locus of the DNA.

42. See Slobogin, supra note 40, at 151–57, for an overview of the scholarship.
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND GENETIC DATA
The Supreme Court is reconsidering its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, but the end result of this rethinking remains unclear.
After briefly canvassing this jurisprudence, we describe current and
emerging genetic investigation techniques and the potential impact of
the Fourth Amendment on their use.
A. A Primer on Fourth Amendment Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment establishes “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”43 Thus, the amendment applies
only to government actions that rise to the level of a “search,” and even
then, protects only against searches that are “unreasonable.” Both of
these concepts have been the subject of extensive legal analysis and
discussion. This Article focuses on the fact that, in defining the
threshold issue of when a Fourth Amendment search occurs, the
Supreme Court has relied heavily on whether the police action in
question infringes expectations of privacy “that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable,”44 a standard that has been operationalized
principally through the “knowing exposure doctrine” and the “thirdparty doctrine.”
1. The Knowing Exposure Doctrine. In applying the reasonable
expectation of privacy formulation, the Court has tended to conclude
that one cannot expect privacy vis-à-vis the government if one cannot
expect privacy vis-à-vis strangers. For instance, activities that take
place in public or that can be observed from a public place are typically
not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, travels on public
thoroughfares,45 garbage placed at curbside,46 and activities that take
place in open fields beyond the home’s curtilage,47 are all subject to
police examination without any Fourth Amendment restrictions, as are
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
44. The most recent citation to this language comes from Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018), although the Court has referred to this formulation in well over a dozen
other cases. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (“Our Fourth Amendment
analysis . . . inquire[s] whether the individual’s expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979))).
45. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
46. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
47. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
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activities in the home that can be seen with the naked eye or using
technology that is in “general public use.”48 Presumably, the Court
would reach the same result when the police acquire a person’s DNA
from items discarded in public places; certainly, lower courts have done
so.49
There are signs that the Court is reconsidering this “knowing
exposure” doctrine, however. In United States v. Jones,50 the Court held
that tracking a car for twenty-eight days using a GPS attached to its
bumper was a search, even though the GPS only tracked the car when
it traveled public thoroughfares.51 At the same time, Jones was limited
to situations where the tracking was effected with a trespass—in this
case, the attachment of the GPS device to the car.52 More importantly,
for purposes of this Article, Jones and its progeny did not directly
confront any of the Court’s precedent establishing its closely related,
but still distinct, doctrine dealing with police access to information
surrendered to third parties. Any discussion of the Fourth
Amendment’s application to police access of genetic information must
confront the implications of that precedent—precedent that also may
be evolving.
2. The Third-Party Doctrine and Carpenter. Closely related to the
knowing exposure doctrine is the third-party doctrine, which severely
limits Fourth Amendment protection of information handed over to
third parties. Building on cases holding that undercover activity is not
a search because the target “assumes the risk” that acquaintances are

48. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
49. See Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic
Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 696–97 (2011) (describing a trend among lower courts
to rely on California v. Greenwood in finding no Fourth Amendment protections for discarded
DNA); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 356–57 (Mass. 2007) (DNA from cigarette
butts and water bottle); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 38 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (DNA from an
envelope); State v. Wickline, 440 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Neb. 1989) (DNA from cigarette butts).
50. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
51. Id. at 404.
52. Id. at 404–05 (basing the decision on the fact that “[t]he Government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information”). However, five Justices would have
based the decision on the ground that Jones’s expectations of privacy were violated by the
tracking. See id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 427–28 (Alito, J., concurring) (joined
by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan).
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or will be government informers,53 in United States v. Miller,54 the
Supreme Court held that individuals are not entitled to a reasonable
expectation of privacy in voluntarily surrendered information even
when the third party is a bank rather than an acquaintance.55 The Court
concluded that a bank depositor
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information
will be conveyed by that person to the Government . . . even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed.56

This third-party doctrine was applied again three years later in Smith
v. Maryland57 to uphold the warrantless seizure from the defendant’s
phone company of a number he had called, on the theory that he
“assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers
he dialed.”58
Lower courts have extended this reasoning to uphold warrantless
government access to records from auditors and accountants, trustees
in bankruptcy, government institutions and, most importantly for our
purposes, medical institutions.59 Many commentators have harshly
criticized these cases on the ground that they ignore the assumptions
about privacy that most people have in these situations.60 But until they
are overturned, these cases would seem to allow law enforcement to

53. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (“The risk of being . . . betrayed by an
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is . . . the kind of risk we
necessarily assume whenever we speak.” (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting))); see also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S 206, 206–07 (1966) (holding
that selling drugs to an undercover federal narcotics agent in the defendant’s home did not
constitute a search).
54. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
55. Id. at 437.
56. Id. at 443.
57. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
58. Id. at 744.
59. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 41, at 153 (citing cases).
60. See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting
Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 999–1005
(2007); Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein
and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1248–50 (2009); Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After
Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1375–91 (2019); Claire Abrahamson, Note, Guilt by Genetic
Association: The Fourth Amendment and the Search of Private Genetic Databases by Law
Enforcement, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2539, 2554–83 (2019).
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obtain, without any Fourth Amendment impediments, DNA
voluntarily submitted to a third party.
Then, in 2018, came Carpenter v. United States.61 There, the Court
held that law enforcement must generally obtain a warrant to gain
access to cell-site location records held by the defendant’s phone
company.62 The government argued that the third-party doctrine
applied because the defendant “voluntarily” surrendered his location
information to the company when he purchased the phone.63 Gesturing
toward the knowing-exposure doctrine, the government also
contended that the location data only revealed travels in public and
was not the defendant’s property.64 But the Court reasoned that
“[t]here is a world of difference between the limited types of personal
information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle
of location information casually collected by wireless carriers today.”65
It also emphasized that one does not “truly ‘share[]’” one’s location
data with one’s phone company, given the necessity of having a phone
in modern society.66 While the majority denied that it was upending the
third-party doctrine, the dissenters contended that the decision lays the
groundwork for doing precisely that.67
In the wake of Carpenter, considerable uncertainty exists about
the applicability of the third-party doctrine to genetic information,
even at the Supreme Court level. Justice Gorsuch, writing in dissent in
Carpenter, expressed skepticism about the third-party doctrine
generally, and specifically its application to certain categories of
sensitive information such as genetic data. As the opening quote to this
Article indicated, Justice Gorsuch used DNA access as an example of
the proposition that “[p]eople often do reasonably expect that
information they entrust to third parties, especially information subject
to confidentiality agreements, will be kept private.”68

61. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206 (2018).
62. Id. at 2217.
63. Id. at 2219.
64. Id. at 2218–19.
65. Id. at 2219.
66. Id. at 2220.
67. Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[B]y invalidating the Government’s use of courtapproved compulsory process in this case, the Court calls into question the subpoena practices of
federal and state grand juries, legislatures, and other investigative bodies . . . .”).
68. Id. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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It remains to be seen what implications Carpenter will have for
genetic data that has been surrendered to a third-party database.
Before we provide our answer to that question, and the data that back
it up, we provide an overview of the current and emerging ways in
which law enforcement might utilize genetic information and discuss in
greater detail the evolving legal frameworks that govern such searches.
B. Law Enforcement Use of Genetic Data
The two principal ways law enforcement agencies use genetic data
are to track down potential perpetrators of crime by matching DNA
found at a crime scene with the DNA of an identifiable person, and to
identify human remains.69 In a narrow set of cases, genetic information
may also be useful means to discover a person’s health history,70 or to
provide law enforcement with clues about the physical appearance of
the perpetrator;71 in the future, it may also help to determine the
propensities of an individual for sentencing purposes.72 While these
latter types of genetic sleuthing have even greater implications for
privacy and autonomy than DNA matching, today they are rare or are
only beginning to be investigated. This Article focuses solely on the
extent to which law enforcement uses genetic data for matching
purposes—the most prolific reason by far the government wants DNA
profiles.
This Section begins with a description of government-run forensic
databases and law enforcement access to the data contained therein. It
then discusses developments with respect to law enforcement access to
genetic data maintained by third parties in public genealogy resources

69. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet [https://
perma.cc/JA36-7Q57].
70. For example, genetic information can be used to, inter alia, diagnose whether an
individual has a disease, is a carrier for a disease, or is predisposed to a disease. What Are the
Types of Genetic Tests?, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Aug. 17, 2020), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
primer/testing/uses [https://perma.cc/7YNK-DCNT]. In a small subset of cases, this type of healthrelated information may provide investigative leads.
71. For example, Parabon Nanolabs markets a “Snapshot DNA Phenotyping Service” that
uses crime scene DNA samples to make predictions about the physical appearance of the
suspected perpetrator. The Snapshot DNA Phenotyping Service, PARABON NANOLABS, https://
snapshot.parabon-nanolabs.com/phenotyping [https://perma.cc/PN35-UU5J].
72. Sally McSwiggan, Bernice Elger & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Forensic Use of Behavioral
Genetics in Criminal Proceedings: Case of the MAOA-L Genotype, 50 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
17, 21–22 (2017).
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and private databases—specifically, DTC-GT companies, health care
providers, and researchers. It concludes with a brief discussion of
surreptitious collection and analysis of genetic material by law
enforcement.
1. Government-Run Forensic Databases. Maryland v. King,
decided in 2013, cleared the way for government-run databases when
it held that DNA collection from arrestees “is, like fingerprinting and
photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”73 But well before King
sanctioned them on constitutional grounds, these databases had been
expanding at the federal, state, and local levels.74 Since 1994, the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has maintained a nationwide
database—CODIS—consisting of federal (“NDIS”), state (“SDIS”),
and local (“LDIS”) levels.75 Today, the federal government, all fifty
states, and the District of Columbia contribute profiles to CODIS,
which contains the genetic profiles of more than 18 million individuals
who have been either arrested for or convicted of a crime, as well as
over 1 million forensic profiles derived from crime scenes.76 It has
produced hits that have assisted in over five hundred thousand
investigations.77
While the Fourth Amendment imposes few constraints on these
systems, statutes do regulate their use. The DNA Identification Act of
199478 imposes standards, proficiency testing, and accreditation
requirements on participating forensic laboratories,79 sets privacy
protection standards for data within the system,80 and imposes steep

73. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013).
74. Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law
Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?, 34.2 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 153–55 (2006).
75. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUST., AUDIT REPORT: THE COMBINED DNA
INDEX SYSTEM ii, 4 (2001), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0126/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N5SL-LEZD]; see also Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis [https://perma.
cc/K953-MYGQ].
76. CODIS-NDIS Statistics, supra note 3.
77. Id.
78. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2065 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 34 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
79. 34 U.S.C. §§ 12592(b), 12593(a) (2018).
80. § 12593(b).
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penalties for misuse or unauthorized access.81 All fifty states as well as
the federal government have also enacted laws that regulate the
compelled collection of DNA from individuals convicted of certain
crimes, the results of which are then uploaded into CODIS.82 In
addition, at least thirty-one states and the federal government have
authorized the preconviction collection of DNA from individuals
arrested or charged with certain crimes83—generally felonies, but also
enumerated misdemeanors in some jurisdictions.84 Some of these new
state and local databases may contain profiles that are ineligible for
upload to CODIS,85 and some may operate under less stringent
laboratory standards and proficiency requirements than, or lack the
privacy protections of, the national system.86 Yet they are still routinely
used in the investigatory process.87
An important development in this respect is the familial matching
procedure alluded to in the opening hypothetical. Investigators can
now use CODIS to carry out “familial DNA searching” (“FDS”), a
deliberate search for partial matches with a DNA sample’s genetic
profile in order to locate possible relatives (generally following an
unsuccessful attempt to obtain a direct match and often with the use of
specialized, non-CODIS software).88 Such searches are usually carried
out at the SDIS level of CODIS, leaving “[e]ach jurisdiction [to]
determine whether or not they are authorized to perform familial
searching, and if so, the criteria and procedures governing their use of
this searching process.”89 According to a 2017 survey of forensic crime
laboratories, at least eleven states conduct familial DNA searching,
81. § 12593(c).
82. DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Dec. 6, 2012), https://
nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/dna-sample-collection-arrestees [https://perma.cc/4SQT-2F4F].
83. Id.
84. See DNA Arrestee Laws, supra note 22.
85. Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated World of State
and Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639, 648–49, 667–80 (2014).
86. Id. at 643–63.
87. Id. at 669.
88. See Sara Debus-Sherrill & Michael B. Field, Familial DNA Searching – An Emerging
Forensic Investigative Tool, 59 SCI. & JUST. 20, 20, 23–24 (2019).
89. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet [https://
perma.cc/GGH3-HTK8]; see Comments on the Interim Rule, DNA Sample Collection From
Federal Offenders Under the Justice for All Act of 2004 and on the Proposed Rule, DNA-Sample
Collection Under the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 and the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,936, 74,938 (Dec. 10, 2008).
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and twenty-four states pursue partial matches that may be indicative of
familial relationships.90 Other jurisdictions place restrictions on FDS
(for example, California91) or have banned this particular version of
DNA searching (Maryland92 and Washington D.C.93 are two
examples).
Legal scholars have raised numerous questions about FDS.94 In
addition to the potential for error that is associated with any attempt
to match profiles, there is the high probability that innocent relatives
of the “lead”—the person whose DNA is matched—will be subjected
to heightened police scrutiny, including attempts to obtain their DNA
in the manner described in our introductory hypothetical.95 These
relatives may never have met or even know about either the lead or the
suspect, or may know about them and have tried to avoid association;
in either case, FDS can disrupt or complicate family connections.96
Furthermore, because people of color tend to be overrepresented in
government-run databases, FDS using existing forensic databases can
give rise, at the least, to the appearance of bias.97 Yet, as Professor Erin
Murphy has ably demonstrated, constructing either Fourth
90. SARA DEBUS-SHERRILL & MICHAEL B. FIELD, ICF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILIAL DNA
SEARCHING: POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND POTENTIAL IMPACT 11–12 (2017), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251043.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T95-BU2A].
91. BFS DNA Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/bfs/prop69/
faqs [https://perma.cc/N73W-NLF4] (describing California’s policy to perform familial searches
only on “database profiles from samples collected from convicted offenders”); see also
Memorandum of Understanding: Familial Searching Protocol from Cal. Dep’t of Just. 1–3 (June
14, 2011), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/bfs/fsc-mou-06142011.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A6EY-APTC] (listing prerequisites and conditions for conducting a familial search).
92. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (LexisNexis 2018) (proscribing familial
searches “of the statewide DNA data base”).
93. D.C. CODE § 22-4151(b) (2013) (banning familial searches of any “DNA collected by an
agency of the District of Columbia”).
94. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 291, 330–40 (2010) [hereinafter Murphy, Relative Doubt] (noting multiple potential
constitutional challenges against FDS); Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial
Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751, 783–807 (2011) (arguing that “fortuitous” partial matching,
arising from low-stringency searches for direct matches is no better than the “deliberate” partial
matching of FDS); see also Abrahamson, supra note 60, at 2553–88 (viewing familial searches
through the lens of the third-party doctrine).
95. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 94, at 313–14.
96. See id. at 314 (“[E]ven mere suspicion, quickly dispelled, has the potential to disrupt a
career, destroy a marriage, or ruin a life.”).
97. Erin Murphy & Jun H. Tong, The Racial Composition of Forensic DNA Databases, 108
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 45–46), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477974
[https://perma.cc/N4MP-BP25].
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Amendment or Equal Protection Clause arguments against FDS is
difficult.98 To date, the courts have given government-run databases
and FDS a very wide berth.99
In the meantime, government-run forensic databases are likely to
continue to grow, especially with the implementation of technologies
like “RapidDNA” and portable devices that have made DNA analysis
exponentially easier.100 In 2017, President Trump signed into law the
Rapid DNA Act, which amended the DNA Identification Act of
1994101 and laid the groundwork for “police agencies to develop DNA
profiles independent of crime laboratories, eliminating the need for
expertise and the long turnaround time for profiling offenders for the
database.”102 A number of jurisdictions have already taken advantage
of this authorization.103
2. Publicly Accessible Databases. Government-run databases
have tremendous crime-solving potential, but law enforcement is
increasingly turning to public and private sources of genetic
information for a number of reasons. First, as just noted, governmentrun databases tend to be heavily skewed toward low-income and nonwhite individuals.104 Thus, they were useless in tracking down Joseph
DeAngelo, the infamous “Golden State Killer” (“GSK”) a white,
middle-class ex-police officer now convicted of murdering and raping
98. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 94, at 330–40. One significant problem is standing;
even if the Fourth Amendment were held to apply to genetic searches, if a defendant is discovered
through familial matching, only the family member in the database would generally have standing
to exclude evidence. This is a remedy the innocent family member would not need. Id. at 334.
However, the family member could seek damages and might well do so if the privacy invasion or
associated stigma is significant. See id. at 314.
99. See Ram, supra note 94, at 790 n.191, 791 n.192 (surveying lower court decisions
upholding forensic databases); see also United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2007)
(surveying case law analyzing the constitutionality of the DNA Identification Act); United States
v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[C]ompulsory DNA profiling of qualified
federal offenders is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.”).
100. RapidDNA, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/
biometric-analysis/codis/rapid-dna [https://perma.cc/8LXL-7T8G].
101. Rapid DNA Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-50, 131 Stat. 1001 (codified at 34 U.S.C.
§§ 12591, 12592, 40702, 40703).
102. Nancy Zhang, Rapid DNA Act of 2017 (Public Law 115-50), SCIPOL, https://
scipol.duke.edu/track/public-law-115-50-rapid-dna-act-2017/rapid-dna-act-2017-public-law-11550 [https://perma.cc/9LSL-E7MK].
103. Heather Murphy, Coming Soon to a Police Station Near You: The DNA ‘Magic Box,’
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2HpdDrD [https://perma.cc/4V43-CUPF].
104. Murphy & Tong, supra note 97 (manuscript at 45).
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dozens of individuals during the 1970s and 1980s.105 DeAngelo was
discovered through a DNA search, but not one using a government
database.106 Rather, after years of dead ends, in 2018 police finally
obtained a hit using a publicly accessible genealogy database,
GEDmatch,107 and a modernized version of FDS called “investigative
(or forensic) genetic genealogy” or “long-range familial searching.”108
GEDmatch allows individuals to upload existing genetic
information about themselves—most commonly the raw data they
received from a DTC-GT company for ancestry purposes—which can
then be used for genealogy research and to locate biological relatives.109
As the GSK case illustrates, genealogy databases like GEDmatch
provide law enforcement with a complementary resource to
supplement government-run forensic databases. Compared to the
general population, DTC-GT users tend to be predominately of
European descent, more educated, and of higher socioeconomic
status.110
The advantages of forensic genetic genealogy that relies on a
public resource such as GEDmatch extend beyond the racial makeup
of the database. Unlike CODIS, which focuses on a limited set of
twenty loci, profiles uploaded to GEDmatch generally consist of
hundreds of thousands of single nucleotide polymorphisms
(“SNPs”).111 All of this additional genetic information dramatically

105. See Heather Murphy & Tim Arango, Joseph DeAngelo Pleads Guilty in Golden State
Killer Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://nyti.ms/31zkBCy [https://perma.cc/74TF-XK78]
(“DeAngelo had eluded the authorities for four decades before he was arrested in 2018 in a
Sacramento suburb.”).
106. Id.
107. Thomas Fuller, How a Genealogy Site Led to the Front Door of the Golden State Killer
Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FkaItN [https://perma.cc/ZQU8-C3LD];
Tools for DNA and Genealogy Research, supra note 5.
108. Teneille R. Brown, Why We Fear Genetic Informants: Using Genetic Genealogy To Catch
Serial Killers, 21 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 114, 128–29 (2020); see Ellen M. Greytak, CeCe
Moore & Steven L. Armentrout, Genetic Genealogy for Cold Case and Active Investigations, 299
FORENSIC SCI. INT. 103, 103–05 (2019) (providing an overview of the science and methodology
underlying the technique).
109. Charlie Osbourne, GEDmatch Highlights Security Concerns of DNA Comparison
Websites, ZDNET (Oct. 31, 2019, 1:02 PM), https://zd.net/2BYuT1p [https://perma.cc/8HTFV4W8].
110. J. Scott Roberts, Michele C. Gornick, Deanna Alexis Carere, Wendy R. Uhlmann, Mack
T. Ruffin & Robert C. Green, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: User Motivations, Decision
Making, and Perceived Utility of Results, 20 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 36, 39–42 (2017).
111. See Greytak et al., supra note 108, at 103, 106.
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improves the ability of consumers, including law enforcement, to
identify distant relatives and provides investigators with more insight
about the degree of relatedness—for example, whether the partial
match is a parent, a sibling, or a cousin of the alleged perpetrator.112
The police in the GSK case had to pose as the donor of the DNA
they submitted,113 given GEDmatch’s policy at the time that individuals
should “provide real names for registration and data upload.”114
However, in the wake of that case, GEDmatch quickly changed its
policy to explicitly allow for law enforcement matching in homicide,
sexual assault, and missing persons cases.115 The service has since been
used by law enforcement in at least one hundred cold cases,116
generating dozens of leads, numerous arrests, and at least one
conviction.117 The power of long-range familial searching was
dramatically illustrated by the authors of a 2019 study, who calculated
that, in theory, GEDmatch could be used to identify well over half of
the people in the United States who are of European ancestry, either
directly or through a relative who had contributed genetic information
to the database.118 The authors predicted that this figure would rise to
over 99 percent as the size of the database grew.119
Shortly after this study was published, however, press accounts
revealed that the founder of GEDmatch had allowed the service to be
112. See id. at 103–06.
113. Arango, Goldman & Fuller, supra note 6.
114. GEDmatch.Com Terms and Policy Statement, GEDMATCH (Aug. 18, 2017), https://
web.archive.org/web/20180427152614/https://www.gedmatch.com/policy.php [https://perma.cc/
S4AQ-W4CB].
115. See GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH (May 20, 2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180524135016/https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm [https://perma.c
c/7EXY-ZJDG]; Debbie Kennett, Updates to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy at
GEDmatch, CRUWYS NEWS (May 21, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://cruwys.blogspot.com/2018/05/
updates-to-terms-of-service-and-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/R8WK-Z4YL] (summarizing the
changes to GEDmatch’s privacy policy that occurred in the wake of the Golden State Killer
revelations).
116. Peter Aldhous, DNA Data from 100 Crime Scenes Has Been Uploaded to a Genealogy
Website — Just Like the Golden State Killer, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 17, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/parabon-genetic-genealogy-cold-cases [https://perma.cc/
D5S3-WYR2].
117. See, e.g., Greytak et al., supra note 108, at 104; Heather Murphy, Genealogy Sites Have
Helped Identify Suspects. Now They’ve Helped Convict One., N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://
nyti.ms/2KT4k42 [https://perma.cc/92VG-MNLN].
118. See Erlich et al., supra note 17, at 690 (“[N]early 60% of long-range familial searches
return . . . [results] usually correspond[ing] to a third cousin or closer relative.”).
119. Id.
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used to solve an assault case in Utah. Although the assault was brutal,
it was not sexual in nature and did not result in death, so the
authorization was contrary to the company’s posted terms and
conditions.120 Because of the resulting public backlash, GEDmatch
subsequently modified its policies to require both current and future
users to opt in before their genetic information could be queried for
law enforcement purposes.121 Despite recent studies that indicate a
high level of public support for the use of public databases by law
enforcement to investigate serious violent crimes,122 only a small
percentage of GEDmatch users appear to have subsequently opted
back in for law enforcement matching.123 This development has vastly
reduced the amount of genetic information available to law
enforcement and resulted in a “sharp drop in the usefulness” of the
resource, with law enforcement officials lamenting that “[t]here are
cases that won’t get solved or will take longer to solve.”124
Yet GEDmatch will likely remain an important law enforcement
tool and a central figure in the ongoing debate about the appropriate
use of forensic genetic genealogy. In December of 2019, GEDmatch
was acquired by Verogen, a forensic genomics firm that caters to law

120. See Peter Aldhous, This Genealogy Database Helped Solve Dozens of Crimes. But Its
New Privacy Rules Will Restrict Access by Cops., BUZZFEED NEWS (May 19, 2019, 3:41 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/this-genealogy-database-helped-solve-dozens
-of-crimes-but [https://perma.cc/DLU4-H9NU]; Jon Schuppe, Police Were Cracking Cold Cases
with a DNA Website. Then the Fine Print Changed., NBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 9:53 AM), https:/
/www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/police-were-cracking-cold-cases-dna-website-then-fine-printn1070901 [https://perma.cc/PFE6-YHR3].
121. Schuppe, supra note 120.
122. Christi J. Guerrini, Jill O. Robinson, Devan Petersen & Amy L. McGuire, Should Police
Have Access to Genetic Genealogy Databases? Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other
Criminals Using a Controversial New Forensic Technique, PLOS BIOLOGY, Oct. 2, 2018, at 4 fig.1,
https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.2006906&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/9AY3-MX7W] (finding that 91 percent of respondents supported the use of
genealogy websites to investigate violent crimes and missing persons cases, with support dropping
to just 46 percent for nonviolent crimes); see also Maurice Gleeson, How Do You Feel About
Your DNA Being Used by the Police? - The Results of a Survey, DNA & FAM. TREE RSCH. (Nov.
14, 2018, 7:16 PM), https://dnaandfamilytreeresearch.blogspot.com/2018/11/how-do-you-feelabout-your-dna-being.html [https://perma.cc/F7RQ-MMQ8] (reporting that 85 percent of 639
surveyed genealogists were “reasonably comfortable” with police use of a public genealogy
database containing their own DNA data “to help identify serial rapists and serial killers”).
123. See Schuppe, supra note 120.
124. Id.
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enforcement.125 To date, the company has publicly committed to
respecting the preferences of existing users regarding law enforcement
matching and has vowed to resist broad warrants.126 However, as noted
previously, company policies are subject to change at any time.127 And
if, as in the past, police officers are willing to pretend the DNA they
submit is theirs—or are able to obtain, as they did in one recent case, a
warrant granting access to the information of all users, including those
who have opted out of law enforcement searches128—the entire
database could be at their disposal. Further, as recounted in more
detail below, genealogy databases like GEDmatch are not the only
nongovernmental resource that police might use to conduct long-range
familial searches.
3. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies. Genetic
information housed in the databases of DTC-GT companies represents
an increasingly valuable target for law enforcement. More than 26
million individuals have now undergone testing with such companies,
which today exist in the hundreds.129 These companies offer services
that purport to translate a person’s genetic information into insights
about their health, ancestry and family relationships, lifestyle choices,
and a host of other areas.130 The amount of genetic information

125. Megan Molteni, A DNA Firm That Caters to Police Just Bought a Genealogy Site, WIRED
(Dec. 9, 2019, 9:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/a-dna-firm-that-caters-to-police-justbought-a-genealogy-site [https://perma.cc/9QGS-BS8U].
126. Id.
127. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 23, at 49. Further, DTC-GT databases may experience
security breaches with implications for law enforcement matching that can undermine a
company’s stated policies. On July 19, 2020, GEDmatch experienced “a security breach
orchestrated through a sophisticated attack . . . [and] [a]s a result . . . all user permissions were
reset, making all profiles visible to all users.” GEDmatch Incident Response, VEROGEN (July 20,
2020), https://verogen.com/gedmatch-incident-response [https://perma.cc/N469-G4KL]. For a
period of three hours, “users who did not opt-in for law enforcement matching were available for
law enforcement matching, and, conversely, all law enforcement profiles were made visible to
GEDmatch users.” Id. While the company has stated that “[n]o user data was downloaded or
compromised,” the extent to which law enforcement agencies had expanded access to the
resource while permissions were incorrectly set is unclear. See id.
128. Hill & Murphy, supra note 5.
129. See supra note 7; see also Andelka M. Phillips, Data on Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing and DNA Testing Companies, ZENODO (Feb. 19, 2018), https://zenodo.org/record/
1183565#.XkBSnC2ZNp8 [https://perma.cc/CCC3-N75K].
130. Andelka M. Phillips, Only a Click Away — DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health, Love . . .
and More: A View of the Business and Regulatory Landscape, 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL
GENOMICS 16, 17–20 (2016).
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generated as a result of these tests,131 and the terms and conditions that
govern that data, vary widely depending on the nature of the testing
and on the company utilized.132
A 2017 survey of privacy policies of ninety U.S.-based DTC-GT
entities revealed that most of them provide very little information
regarding how they deal with law enforcement requests, with many
simply stating that data may be disclosed “as required by law” or in
response to a warrant, subpoena, or court order.133 Only a handful of
industry leaders—23andMe,134 Ancestry,135 and until recently,
FamilyTreeDNA136—release transparency reports that describe law
enforcement requests for information. A few leading companies also
provide guides for law enforcement that describe their practices when
dealing with such requests.137
These sources suggest that, up until now, law enforcement has
rarely openly sought access to DTC-GT databases. Further, companies
such as 23andMe and Ancestry have publicly stated that they will
rigorously oppose all law enforcement requests.138 Their most recent
transparency reports state that, while they have received several
requests for genetic and nongenetic data, no genetic data have been

131. What Are the Types of Genetic Tests?, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH 5–6 (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing.pdf [https://perma.cc/947S-6Z3P].
132. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 23, at 47–57.
133. Id. at 56–57 (describing the law enforcement provisions in the privacy policies and terms
and conditions of ninety U.S. DTC-GT companies).
134. Transparency Report, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/transparency-report [https:/
/perma.cc/87GC-RCVE] (last updated Nov. 13, 2020).
135. Ancestry Transparency Report, ANCESTRY (July 10, 2020), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/
transparency [https://perma.cc/CV4E-S7KP].
136. See Family Finder, FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com/products/familyfinder [https://perma.cc/T4NL-HJP7].
137. 23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/lawenforcement-guide [https://perma.cc/66DD-KT2V]; Ancestry Guide for Law Enforcement,
ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/lawenforcement [https://perma.cc/4R78-QMHA];
FamilyTreeDNA Law Enforcement Guide, FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com/
legal/law-enforcement-guide [https://perma.cc/4WSM-3B22].
138. See Peter Aldhous, A Court Tried To Force Ancestry.com To Open Up Its DNA Database
to Police. The Company Said No., BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 3, 2020, 7:11 PM), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/ancestry-dna-database-search-warrant [https:/
/perma.cc/V8PJ-GLKR] (“Ancestry and its main competitor, 23andMe . . . have publicly vowed
to defend their customers’ genetic privacy, and say they will fight efforts to open up their
databases to searches by police.”).
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released.139 The one exception comes from Ancestry, which stated that
it disclosed consumer genetic information in response to “a 2014 search
warrant ordering [the company] to provide the identity of a person
based on a DNA sample that had previously been made public for
which the police had a match.”140
However, not all companies are so reluctant to share information.
In February 2019, the New York Times reported that, unbeknownst to
its users, FamilyTreeDNA had been voluntarily providing the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) with access to its services.141
Specifically, the company allowed law enforcement to create
accounts142 and utilize a version of its “Family Finder” service, which
allows consumers to locate potential genetic relatives in a manner
similar to GEDmatch.143 Further, FamilyTreeDNA did not disclose its
cooperation with the FBI in its subsequent transparency report, which
it removed only after the revelations by the Times.144
Like GEDmatch, FamilyTreeDNA was ultimately forced to
change its policies in response to consumer backlash. But rather than
retreating from its previous stance as GEDmatch did,
FamilyTreeDNA has since embraced its role as a tool for law
enforcement. In a new media campaign featuring the father of
Elizabeth Smart—a woman who was kidnapped at age fourteen and
whose abductor and rapist was identified through DNA145—the

139. See, e.g., id. (“Ancestry received one request seeking access to Ancestry’s DNA database
through a search warrant . . . Ancestry challenged the warrant on jurisdictional grounds and did
not provide any customer data in response.”). In 2019, a Pennsylvania court issued a search
warrant that would have given law enforcement access to Ancestry’s entire database. Ancestry is
opposing the warrant in a case that may end up in the Supreme Court. See id.
140. Ancestry 2015 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY (2015), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/
transparency-2015 [https://perma.cc/GFY4-DYKX].
141. Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits To Sharing Genetic Data with F.B.I., N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2DVnK3x [https://perma.cc/B556-9AYB].
142. Id. (“[T]he F.B.I. will have access to its website like any other user . . . .”).
143. See Family Finder, FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com/products/familyfinder [https://perma.cc/T4NL-HJP7].
144. Since the publication of the Times report, FamilyTreeDNA’s “Law Enforcement Guide”
has stated that the company “is working on publishing an updated report that will contain details
on law enforcement requests submitted through a valid court order, valid trial, grand jury,
subpoena, or search warrant for additional personal or genetic information.” FamilyTreeDNA
Law Enforcement Guide, supra note 137.
145. Brady McCombs, Elizabeth Smart Backs Measure To Speed Up DNA Testing, AP NEWS
(July 6, 2017), https://apnews.com/fd693564b0b04cf9a1fb6b52ca722af7 [https://perma.cc/9SQCZCKS].
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company encourages individuals to upload genetic information that
has been profiled by other companies free of charge if they would like
to assist in criminal investigations.146 Thus, unlike GEDmatch,
FamilyTreeDNA automatically opts out only existing users residing in
the European Union; other existing users must choose to opt out.147
New users are given the option of allowing their information to be used
for law enforcement searches, and the company has reported that most
have done so.148
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the use of forensic genetic
genealogy in connection with either public services like GEDmatch or
private DTC-GT companies. Although legal scholars raise many of the
same Fourth Amendment arguments that are aimed at familial
searches of government-run databases,149 as of now company privacy
policies and terms of service or law enforcement’s self-imposed
limitations serve as the primary barrier to law enforcement access to
these resources. Not only do these policies vary significantly among
companies, they are generally subject to change at any time,150 as
illustrated by the evolution of the GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA
protocols dealing with law enforcement. Most importantly, even if
these private databases do not give consumers the option of facilitating
law enforcement investigations, police agencies might still seek to
bypass access restrictions by posing as a civilian consumer, as they did
in the GSK case.
In some jurisdictions, however, law enforcement policies might
restrict such access. For instance, effective November 1, 2019, DOJ
requires federal investigators—as well as state law enforcement agencies
146. You Can Help, FAMILYTREEDNA, https://www.familytreedna.com/join [https://
perma.cc/4X5S-6DQL]; Ed Smart, Father of Elizabeth Smart Teams Up with FamilyTreeDNA,
PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 26, 2019, 3:59 PM), https://prn.to/2Z5QgcZ [https://perma.cc/2QNG-7P5U].
147. Adam Vaughan, Home DNA-Testing Firm Will Let Users Block FBI Access to Their Data,
NEW SCIENTIST (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2196433-home-dna-testingfirm-will-let-users-block-fbi-access-to-their-data [https://perma.cc/KQT5-NK39] (reporting that the
company automatically opts-out users from the European Union, while requiring users in the United
States to take affirmative action if they wish to opt-out).
148. Amy Dockser Marcus, Customers Handed Over Their DNA: The Company Let the FBI
Take a Look., WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2019, 12:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/customershanded-over-their-dna-the-company-let-the-fbi-take-a-look-11566491162 [https://perma.cc/M6QAE4JA] (reporting that only about 2 percent of users opted out in the five months following the policy
change).
149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also Abrahamson, supra note 60, at 2553–
55.
150. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 23, at 49, 57.
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that receive or utilize DOJ funding to engage in forensic genetic
genealogy—to identify themselves to any service they use, whether
public or private.151 Accordingly, the type of investigation carried out in
the GSK case would be prohibited. Further, the policy permits agents to
use only those “services that provide explicit notice to their service users
and the public that law enforcement may use their service sites to
investigate crimes or to identify unidentified human remains.”152 That
language limits DOJ’s access to GEDmatch’s reduced database as well
as to private companies like FamilyTreeDNA that require consumers to
consent to law enforcement use of their databases.
4. Health Care Providers. Police officers or prosecutors may also
seek to compel disclosure of genetic information held by a health care
provider or contained within an electronic health record.153 Given the
nature of existing health care databases and the decentralized nature
of many electronic medical records, these requests are likely to be
targeted, suspect-driven requests for information about a particular
individual, as opposed to the large-scale matching queries of resources
like GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA that are described above. Even
here, however, there are few constraints on police access.
Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), protected health information, including genetic
information, may be disclosed to law enforcement pursuant to a “court
order or court-ordered warrant,” “a subpoena or summons issued by a
judicial officer,” or a “grand jury subpoena.”154 Genetic information
may also be disclosed in response to an “administrative request”155 if
“(1) [t]he information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate
law enforcement inquiry; (2) [t]he request is specific and limited in

151. DEP’T OF JUST., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERIM POLICY: FORENSIC
GENETIC GENEALOGICAL DNA ANALYSIS AND SEARCHING 2, 6 (2019) [hereinafter DOJ INTERIM
POLICY], https://www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1204386/download [https://perma.cc/CK7R-EZ7A].
152. Id. (footnote omitted).
153. See generally When Does the Privacy Rule Allow Covered Entities To Disclose Protected
Health Information to Law Enforcement Officials?, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/505/what-does-the-privacy-rule-allow-covered-entitiesto-disclose-to-law-enforcement-officials/index.html [https://perma.cc/3X6L-R6E8] (summarizing
circumstances in which records can be disclosed to law enforcement).
154. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A)–(B) (2020).
155. “An administrative request[] includ[es] an administrative subpoena or summons, a civil
or an authorized investigative demand, or similar process authorized under law . . . .” Id.
§ 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C).
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scope to the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for
which the information is sought; and (3) [d]e-identified information
could not reasonably be used.”156 In short, a warrant is not necessarily
required to obtain genetic information from a health care provider
under HIPAA.157 Given the diversity of HIPAA-covered entities and
the fact that many of them do not publicly disclose law enforcement’s
requests for data, the extent to which law enforcement takes advantage
of the compelled-disclosure provisions of HIPAA is unknown.
If such compelled disclosure were sought, however, it probably
does not violate the Fourth Amendment to proceed without a warrant.
While that result may seem startling, it is the logical consequence of
the Supreme Court’s third-party doctrine. Unless a doctor seeks
genetic information at the government’s behest,158 the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated, because a patient assumes the risk that
the doctor, like the person’s bank or phone company, will provide the
content of medical records to the government.
5. Researchers. Research datasets, like those used in precision
medicine initiatives, represent still another valuable potential resource
of genetic information. For example, the National Institute of Health’s
AoU Research Program, which is featured in the introductory
hypothetical, is currently recruiting one million Americans to undergo
genetic testing and share their medical records for research.159 To date,
over half of the two hundred thousand-plus individuals who have been
recruited come from populations that are historically underrepresented
in research datasets,160 including racial and sexual minority groups.161
As with health care databases and electronic medical records,
research databases are perhaps most likely to be the subject of
targeted, suspect-driven requests for information about a particular
research participant. Although certain research databases could
156. Id.
157. But see id. § 164.512(f)(2)(ii) (setting explicit limitations on the sharing of DNA-related
information when disclosures are not compelled by law or legal process).
158. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80–81 (2001) (finding that a policy
allowing drug testing of pregnant women violated the Fourth Amendment, but only because the
police were involved in devising and implementing the policy).
159. The Future of Health Begins with You, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH ALL OF US RSCH.
PROGRAM, https://allofus.nih.gov [https://perma.cc/5893-GVB3].
160. Denny, supra note 10.
161. All of Us Rsch. Program Investigators, The “All of Us” Research Program, 381 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 668, 669 (2019).
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possibly be used for large-scale familial searches of the type currently
being performed using GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA, no reports
of such activity have surfaced. Indeed, data in research databases are
generally de-identified—that is, stripped of personally identifiable
information—and would be of limited utility to law enforcement unless
it could be relinked to an individual.162
In any event, many of these research datasets are more heavily
protected from compelled disclosure than the databases of DTC-GT
companies or health care providers under HIPAA. The 21st Century
Cures Act empowers the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
convey CoCs to researchers “engaged in biomedical, behavioral, clinical,
or other research in which identifiable, sensitive information is collected
(including research on mental health and research on the use and effect of
alcohol and other psychoactive drugs).”163 In theory, if shielded by a CoC,
researchers may not be compelled “in any Federal, State, or local civil,
criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding” to identify
individuals who are the subject of such research.164 Research efforts
funded by the National Institutes of Health and other agencies within the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), such as the
AoU Research Program, are automatically issued a CoC.165
Not all research databases are protected to the same extent,
however. Nonfederally funded researchers must apply for a certificate
on a case-by-case basis, meaning that many research datasets may
remain unprotected.166 Furthermore, even the enhanced protections
conveyed by the Cures Act remain largely untested in the courts.167
Prior to its implementation, at least one court had enforced a subpoena

162. Ellen Wright Clayton & Bradley A. Malin, Assessing Risks to Privacy in Biospecimen
Research, in SPECIMEN SCIENCE: ETHICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 143, 144–149 (2017)
(describing the risks and likelihood of re-identification of individuals from biomedical datasets,
including by law enforcement).
163. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 2012(a), 130 Stat. 1033, 1049 (2016)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)(A)).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)(D) (2018).
165. Id. § 241(d)(1)(A)(i); see Notice of Changes to NIH Policy for Issuing Certificates of
Confidentiality, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Sept. 17, 2017), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/
notice-files/NOT-OD-17-109.html [https://perma.cc/JT78-T4S2] (explaining implementation of
the 21st Century Cures Act).
166. See Who Can Get a Certificate of Confidentiality?, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://
grants.nih.gov/policy/humansubjects/coc/who-can.htm [https://perma.cc/PC5C-C5TL].
167. Wolf & Beskow, supra note 12, at 2681.
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overriding the protections of a certificate.168 Even if law enforcement
were limited to de-identified data, there remains a possibility that it
could be relinked to the corresponding individuals.169 And, again, a
strict interpretation of the third-party doctrine would deny Fourth
Amendment protection against such access.
6. Surreptitious Collection and Analysis of DNA.
Law
enforcement may also engage in surreptitious collection of DNA in the
course of a criminal investigation, as occurred in our introductory
hypothetical. This practice can occur independently of, or in
conjunction with, other genetic investigatory techniques, such as longrange familial searches of public and private databases. For example,
after identifying potential suspects in the GSK case using GEDmatch,
law enforcement surreptitiously collected the DNA of the primary
suspect, DeAngelo, first from the door handle of his car, and later from
a discarded tissue, and then matched it with crime scene DNA.170
While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of
surreptitious collection of DNA by law enforcement, the Court has
been reluctant to apply Fourth Amendment protections to
“abandoned” property, holding instead that individuals lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy in discarded items.171 As a result, in
the majority of jurisdictions, police are generally not required to obtain
a warrant or court order before engaging in surreptitious collection of

168. State v. Bradley, 634 S.E.2d 258, 261 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (vacating a trial court’s order
to disclose research records to defense counsel for lack of materiality, but also noting that “[t]he
trial court’s order effectively requires [a research entity] to disclose information concerning the
research subject’s privacy which it is obliged, pursuant to the Certificate of Confidentiality and
federal statutes, to protect”); see Leslie E. Wolf, Mayank J. Patel, Brett A. Williams Tarver,
Jeffrey L. Austin, Lauren A. Dame & Laura M. Beskow, Certificates of Confidentiality: Protecting
Human Subject Research Data in Law and Practice, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 594, 597 (2015).
169. Khaled El Emam, Sam Rodgers & Bradley Malin, Anonymising and Sharing Individual
Patient Data, BMJ, Mar. 20, 2015, at 2–5, https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/350/
bmj.h1139.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J72-RNUV].
170. Nancy Dillon, Golden State Killer Suspect Arrested After Cops Swiped His DNA from Car
Door Handle and Tissue, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 1, 2018, 6:55 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/crime/ny-news-golden-state-killer-dna-collected-car-door-trash-20180601-story.html [https:/
/perma.cc/ER9L-VBSL].
171. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding that inspection of
discarded garbage by police does not constitute a search because “[i]t is common knowledge that
plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public” (footnotes omitted)).
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DNA.172 In addition, state laws that place restrictions on surreptitious
collection and analysis of genetic material without consent generally
contain exceptions for law enforcement.173 And while the
aforementioned DOJ Interim Policy prohibits covert collection of
DNA samples from relatives of a suspect—as opposed to the suspect
themselves—the guidelines allow prosecutors to override that
restriction if they have “reasonable grounds to believe that [seeking
informed consent] would compromise the integrity of the
investigation.”174 This language gives prosecutors wide leeway to
authorize covert collection of DNA.
7. Summary. The foregoing discussion makes clear that there are
two principal situations in which the police might seek DNA for
investigative purposes. The first might be called “suspect-based.” In
this situation, the police have a suspect and want to obtain his or her
DNA, most likely either from the suspect or from the suspect’s health
care provider or from a discarded item. In the second situation, which
might be called “profile-based,” the police have a DNA profile from a
crime scene and want to access a government, public, or private
database to determine whether there is a match or a partial match.
Other than when the police seek DNA directly from a person who has
not been arrested—a scenario that would probably require a warrant,
given King’s distinction between those who have been arrested and
those who have not175—current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
172. Joh, supra note 49, at 699 & n.197 (“In cases of surreptitious sampling, the few decided
cases have analogized genetic information left behind on everyday objects to garbage, and thus
open for police collection without a warrant, individualized suspicion, or consent.”); Albert E.
Scherr, Genetic Privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47
GA. L. REV. 445, 452 (2013) (“[T]he police are beginning to use the technique more frequently.”);
Nicolle K. Strand, Shedding Privacy Along with Our Genetic Material: What Constitutes Adequate
Legal Protection Against Surreptitious Genetic Testing?, 18 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 264, 268–
69 (2016) (noting Alaska’s state law exemption for surreptitious genetic testing by law
enforcement).
173. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(b)(2) (2018) (exempting “DNA samples collected
and analyses conducted . . . for a law enforcement purpose, including the identification of
perpetrators and the investigation of crimes and the identification of missing or unidentified
persons or deceased individuals”); see also GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR., STATE LAWS
PERTAINING TO SURREPTITIOUS DNA TESTING passim (2009), https://web.archive.org/web/
20150306044016/http:/www.dnapolicy.org/resources/State_law_summaries_final_all_states.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ULK-CPDR] (identifying which state laws exempt law enforcement activities).
174. See DOJ INTERIM POLICY, supra note 151, at 6.
175. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463 (2013) (emphasizing the diminished expectation of
privacy of arrestees). Most lower courts have so held. See, e.g., Bill v. Brewer, 799 F.3d 1295, 1301–
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little to say about any of these different types of law enforcement
collection of and access to genetic information. Our empirical study
was designed to cast further light on whether that should change.
II. METHODOLOGY
Our goal in this study was to begin an inquiry into societal views
about the types of genetically focused law enforcement investigations
that were described in Part I. The Supreme Court has made clear that
Fourth Amendment analysis is governed by privacy expectations,
specifically by expectations of privacy society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable.176 Thus, the aggregate views of the citizenry are, at the
least, relevant to the Fourth Amendment question of when a search
has occurred, a point we revisit in the Conclusion.
This study builds on a survey methodology initially pioneered by
Professor Christopher Slobogin, a co-author of this Article, and Joseph
E. Schumacher,177 later modified and extended by Slobogin178 and
others,179 to gauge the intrusiveness of various law enforcement
searches and government activities such as surveillance and data
mining. The basic idea is simple: present a representative sample of the
population with scenarios from court decisions, or variations thereof,
and ask the subjects to rate their “intrusiveness.” The latter word was
intentionally chosen as the dependent variable because it captures both
the property and the privacy components of Fourth Amendment
analysis,180 and because, along with its cousin “invasiveness,” it is
02 (9th Cir. 2015) (assuming a warrant is required in this situation even when subject is not
suspected of a crime); Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 856–58 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that, in
the absence of a statute, status as a pretrial detainee did not justify warrantless, compelled
collection of DNA); State v. Lee, 976 So. 2d 109, 123–24 (La. 2008) (“When the facts of the present
case are compared to the aforementioned jurisprudence of other courts, we find the collection of
defendant’s DNA constituted a search.”).
176. See supra text accompanying note 34.
177. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 733–37 (1993).
178. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 275–80 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining
and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 333–36 (2008).
179. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Catherine Durso, Ian Farrell & Christopher Robertson, Why
Courts Fail To Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 294–97
(2018).
180. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectationof-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).
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frequently used by the Supreme Court itself in describing the scope of
the Fourth Amendment.181
In this study, however, we also asked a follow-up question
explicitly using “expectations of privacy” language. Research relying
on this type of methodology has tended to show that the Supreme
Court’s assumptions or assertions about privacy expectations are
frequently inconsistent with societal views.182 We wanted to inquire
whether this was true of scenarios involving government collection of
and access to genetic information, specifically DNA profiles for
identification purposes.
A. Survey Creation and Validation
The materials for this research were developed in coordination
with an interdisciplinary working group consisting of scholars from the
law, medicine, psychology, history, economics, and humanities fields.183
In order to validate the surveys, we conducted two pilot tests: first with
a group of approximately seventy graduate students at Vanderbilt Law
School and then with approximately two hundred individuals on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”). Respondents were given the
opportunity to provide feedback on the surveys and describe any areas
of confusion or technical difficulties that they encountered. Feedback
revealed several areas of ambiguity and the scenarios were modified
accordingly before being administered to the full set of participants.
The final surveys consisted of twenty-one short scenarios
describing law enforcement access either to genetic data or to other
types of personal information, such as the contents of a bedroom, text
messages, or web-browsing history. Appendix A contains the complete
scenarios. Nine of the scenarios involved police collection of or access
to DNA. The other twelve described other types of police searches.
While our primary goal was to evaluate privacy expectations in
connection with the DNA-related scenarios, we included the other
scenarios for comparison purposes. Particularly important for Fourth

181. See Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr
and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1595 (2010) (reporting that these terms have been used in over
two hundred Supreme Court Fourth Amendment cases).
182. See generally sources cited supra notes 177–79179.
183. The survey was circulated to investigators at The Center for Genetic Privacy and Identity
in Community Settings (GetPreCiSe) at Vanderbilt University. A complete list of members is
available at: https://www.vumc.org/getprecise/person/team [https://perma.cc/W5BN-8UU9].
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Amendment analysis were the scenarios involving searching a
bedroom, searching emails, performing a pat down (or frisk) and
setting up a roadblock. The Supreme Court has held that all four of
these scenarios are governed by the Fourth Amendment. The first two
require probable cause (and a warrant in non-exigent
circumstances),184 the pat down requires reasonable suspicion,185 and
the roadblock requires individualized suspicion or a neutral plan,186
depending on whether it is aimed at “ordinary crime control”187 or is
more regulatory in orientation.188
The use of single-sentence scenarios allowed us to gather
responses on a broad range of law enforcement activities in a short
period of time. While this type of query obviously does not provide full
context to the subjects, it does provide a description that is consistent
with “black letter law” on the Fourth Amendment. For instance,
“police looking at all of the text messages that a person has sent or
received” on his or her phone in the absence of consent describes a
situation that, regardless of context, requires probable cause.189
Similarly, “police getting a person’s DNA profile from a genetic testing
company (such as Ancestry or 23andMe) that the person has used in
the past” describes a situation currently governed by the third-party
doctrine.190 We hoped a comparison of the intrusiveness ratings of
these types of scenarios would help us determine how society views
genetic investigations relative to other investigations known to be
governed by the Fourth Amendment.

184. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1969) (holding that the search of a home
requires a warrant in non-exigent circumstances); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44, 63–64
(1967) (holding that interception of electronic communications requires a warrant).
185. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
186. Compare City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44, 47 (2000) (“When law enforcement
authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints . . . , stops can only be
justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.”), with United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (“[S]tops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant.”).
187. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 47 (“Of course, there are circumstances that may justify a law
enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency,
relate to ordinary crime control.”).
188. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545, 566 (“We also hold that the operation of a fixed
checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by a judicial warrant.”). But see id. at 567 (“[O]ur
holding today is limited to the type of stops described in this opinion.”); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43
(“[T]he border context . . . was crucial in Martinez-Fuerte.”).
189. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
190. See supra Part I.A.2.
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To gain a more nuanced understanding of the factors influencing
participants’ attitudes, we employed five closely related versions of the
survey. Some empirical work has suggested that people’s views about the
intrusiveness of police actions might vary, depending both on whether
their privacy, as opposed to someone else’s, is invaded by the police
action, and on the reason for that action.191 Thus, in addition to a baseline
survey, which simply told the participants the police were looking for
evidence of an unspecified crime committed by an unspecified person, we
constructed four other surveys with slightly different instructions that
varied: (i) the subjects’ perspective by asking them to assume that they,
rather than an unidentified person, were the target of the police action
(first-person condition); (ii) the goal of the police action, with one
variation asking participants to assume (a) that police were looking for
evidence of serious crime (serious-crime condition) and the other (b) that
police were trying to prevent a serious crime (crime-prevention condition);
and (iii) whether evidence was found during the police action rather than
merely searched for (hindsight-bias condition). A detailed summary of the
experimental variations is found in Appendix B.
Once the scenarios were constructed, electronic survey instruments
were created using the Research Electronic Data Capture (“REDCap”)
tools hosted at Vanderbilt University. In Part I of the survey,
participants were asked to rank each scenario on a 100-point scale
ranging from “not intrusive at all” (0) to “extremely intrusive” (100). In
Part II, participants were presented with the same twenty-one scenarios
and asked whether each scenario described a situation in which a person
was entitled to a “reasonable expectation of privacy” (yes/no). In both
parts, participants were instructed to read all twenty-one scenarios
carefully before answering and were told they could go back and change
their answers after reading and responding to other scenarios. However,
once in Part II, participants could not go back to Part I.
B. Study Population and Demographics
Participants were recruited via MTurk, an online crowdsourcing
marketplace,192 and paid one dollar following successful completion of

191. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 177, at 765–68 (advancing “inference of guilt”
and “dangerousness” theories as to why certain scenarios were rated as relatively less intrusive in
the third-person scenarios).
192. Overview, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com [https://perma.cc/
2MH9-ABQY].
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one of the five variations of survey. The surveys were administered
over the course of two weeks in December 2018 and were limited to
subjects who had not previously taken any of the other variations of
the survey. The average time respondents spent completing the surveys
was 13.8 minutes.
The 1,597 respondents represented a diverse population that
included significant ranges in age, education level, socioeconomic
status, political affiliation, and religiosity. In summary, 1,257
respondents identified as white (78.7%), 180 as Black or African
American (11.3%), 79 as Asian (4.9%), and 22 as American Indian or
Alaska Native (1.4%). Responding to a separate question, 172
respondents reported Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (10.7%). The
majority characterized their previous interactions with law
enforcement as either “all positive” (362; 22.7%) or “mostly positive”
(629; 39.4%), and their neighborhood as “low crime” (1,148; 71.9%).
A small number of participants reported having previously undergone
genetic testing through a doctor (143; 9.0%), DTC-GT company (185;
11.6%), or as part of a research study (92; 5.8%), although the vast
majority reported no previous testing (1,177; 73.7%). A complete list
of the demographic information is found in Appendix C.
C. Limitations
We note that MTurk workers, while demographically diverse in
many respects, tend to be predominately white, and are generally
younger, more highly educated, and more computer literate when
compared to the entire U.S. population.193 Indeed, Professors Matthew
B. Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz have observed that “Mechanical
Turk respondents are significantly more privacy-protective than the
general U.S. population, perhaps because they skew younger.”194 As a
result, they conclude that “one should not use Mechanical Turk
samples to assess the base-rate support for privacy-related beliefs in
the general population.”195 But they also state that MTurk “may . . . still

193. Joel Ross, Andrew Zaldivar, Lilly Irani & Bill Tomlinson, Who Are the Crowdworkers?
Worker Demographics in Amazon Mechanical Turk, in CHI 2010: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2863, 2865–68 (2010), http://
web.mit.edu/2.744/www/resourceMaterials/otherResources/p2863-ross.pdf [https://perma.cc/852C-X5JM].
194. Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth
Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 233 n.113.
195. Id.

SLOBOGIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/16/2020 12:52 AM

2021] GENETIC DATA AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

743

be valid to use such samples to evaluate the relative intrusiveness of
searches”196 as we do here.
Recently, some concern has been expressed about international
MTurk workers gaining access to surveys designed for U.S. participants
through the use of “virtual private networks” (“VPNs”).197 There are
indications that these participants produce lower quality responses,
perhaps because they are more likely to employ “bots” or “scripts” to
rapidly complete surveys.198 Since we relied on the Amazon platform
to screen in only U.S. participants and did not personally collect or
verify their IP addresses, we are unable to rule out the possibility that
a subset of participants accessed our surveys in such a manner, nor
were we able to assess retroactively the extent to which it occurred.
The countermeasures suggested by some scholars, such as requiring all
participants to turn off VPNs and excluding those who do not,199 may
also introduce bias, as such measures are likely to exclude privacyconscious U.S. participants who utilize VPNs for legitimate, privacyprotective reasons. In an effort to mitigate the concerns described
above, we excluded all responses received in under five minutes (5.1%
of responses; 86 of 1,683 participants), as these response times are
indicative that the individual did not answer thoughtfully, but rather
simply “clicked through” the survey or used a “bot” or “script” to
rapidly generate responses.200
D. Hypotheses
In constructing this study, we started with four general hypotheses.
First, based on the findings of other research in a similar vein,201 we
expected that our survey participants’ intrusiveness ratings and
conclusions about expectations of privacy would bear little relation to
whether the information or items described in a scenario had been
surrendered or was in the possession of a third party, in contrast to the

196. Id.
197. Ryan Kennedy, Scott Clifford, Tyler Burleigh, Philip D. Waggoner, Ryan Jewell &
Nicholas J. G. Winter, The Shape of and Solutions to the MTurk Quality Crisis, 8 POL. SCI. RES. &
METHODS 2–4 (2020), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/
521AEEB9A9753D5C6038440BD123826C/S2049847020000060a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7M6T-YLYJ].
198. Id. at 3–14.
199. Id. at 14–16.
200. After excluding responses received in under five minutes, the average time respondents
spent completing the surveys was 19.4 minutes.
201. See sources cited supra notes 177–79.
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Supreme Court’s third-party doctrine, which often makes this fact
dispositive in finding that no search is involved. Second, given the
intimate, personal nature of DNA, we hypothesized that most of our
genetically focused investigations would be viewed as among the most
intrusive of our twenty-one scenarios. Third, we expected that
participants in the “third-person” condition would assign lower
intrusiveness ratings to the scenarios than those in the “first-person”
condition. Fourth, on the theory that police actions would be viewed as
less intrusive if they occur for a particularly “good reason,” we
hypothesized that participants who were asked to assume the police
were looking for evidence of serious crime, asked to assume the goal of
the action was prevention of serious crime, or asked to assume that the
police actually found the evidence they were looking for, would assign
lower intrusiveness ratings than those who were given scenarios that
simply indicated the police were looking for evidence of an unspecified
crime.
III. RESULTS
This Part first describes the results from our baseline survey, and
then describes the results from the other four surveys. As outlined in
Section A, the results provide significant support for our first two
hypotheses but, as described in Section B, only marginal support for
our third hypothesis and much less support of our fourth hypothesis.
A. Baseline Survey
In the baseline survey, scenarios were presented in the third
person, meaning that the police action was directed at someone other
than the subject. Participants were also told that police were engaging
in the action to locate “evidence of some type of criminal activity.”
Finally, as was the case with all variations of the survey, participants
were told that the subject of the search was presumed innocent and did
not consent to the search.
Table 1 shows the mean intrusiveness rating of each scenario,
along with a confidence interval (“Z”) indicating the extent to which a
given mean intrusiveness rating can be said to differ from adjacent
ratings. The final column indicates the percentage of subjects who
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TABLE 1: INTRUSIVENESS AND EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN 21 SCENARIOS
Baseline Survey: 3rd Person
n = 323
#

Intrusiveness

REP?

2

Scenario:
Genetic Data from
Doctor
Medical Records

3

Bedroom Search

74.0

± 2.6

23.8

74.9%

4

Text Messages

72.7

± 2.4

22.4

77.7%

72.1

± 3.2

29.6

69.0%

71.9

± 2.7

24.9

74.9%

71.9

± 2.4

21.8

76.2%

Financial Records
Collection for a
Universal DNA DB
Genetic Data from
Researchers

70.8

± 2.5

23.3

74.6%

69.3

± 3.4

30.8

64.1%

69.0

± 3.0

27.1

76.8%

11

Web History

66.7

± 2.7

24.4

70.3%

12

Phone Numbers

63.2

± 2.7

24.6

70.3%

13

62.1

± 2.8

25.7

63.2%

60.6

± 3.5

32.5

61.3%

15

Social Media
Universal Fingerprint
DB
Cell Location

60.3

± 2.8

25.6

65.9%

16

Pat Down

55.7

± 2.9

27.0

44.9%

50.2

± 3.3

30.3

42.4%

49.1

± 3.4

31.5

41.2%

39.4

± 3.0

27.4

24.1%

38.9

± 3.4

31.3

33.7%

32.8

± 3.2

29.6

29.7%

1

5
6
7
8
9
10

14

17
18
19
20
21

Familial Search of Public
Genealogy DNA DB
Genetic Data from
DTC-GT Company
Emails

Surreptitious Collection
of Discarded DNA
Compelled DNA
Collection from
Arrestees
Roadblock
Familial Search of
Forensic DNA DB
Search for Suspect in
Forensic DNA DB

Mean

Z

S.D.

% Yes

76.0

± 2.6

24.2

84.2%

74.8

± 2.6

23.7

82.7%
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believed that the indicated police action infringed a “reasonable
expectation of privacy.” The scenarios are ranked from most intrusive
to least intrusive based on their mean intrusiveness rating.202
Note first that, while the scenarios involving genetic information
are spread throughout this hierarchy, many are ranked at the high end.
Respondents ranked law enforcement access to genetic information
from an individual’s doctor as the most intrusive of all the scenarios,
just above police access to other information in medical records. Police
access to public genealogy, direct-to-consumer and research databases,
as well as the creation of a universal DNA database, were also ranked
among the most intrusive activities, on a par with searches of
bedrooms, text messages, and emails, although the public and universal
databases received a lower percentage of positive responses on the
expectation of privacy query than these other scenarios.
These findings support our first hypothesis. The fact that genetic
information resides with a third party does not appear to be an
important consideration when people are asked about the privacy of
that information or police access to it. The findings also clearly support
our second hypothesis. Many types of genetically focused
investigations are perceived to be as intrusive as searches that are
clearly governed by the Fourth Amendment and that require a warrant
based on probable cause.
At the same time, our findings do not support a claim for “genetic
exceptionalism,” the notion that DNA is so private that obtaining it
should always require a warrant. In fact, many scenarios involving
forensic uses of genetic material were ranked among the least intrusive,
including those describing surreptitious collection of DNA, compelled
collection of DNA from arrestees, and law enforcement searches of
government-run forensic databases to locate suspects or relatives of
suspects. All of these scenarios were viewed as less intrusive than a pat

202. We did not find significant demographic differences in terms of mean rankings. However,
only a small portion of our sample identified as African American, a population that has often
expressed more distrust of the police generally and with respect to use of genetic information. See
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Who Locked Us Up? Examining the Social Meaning of Black
Punitiveness, 127 YALE L.J. 2388, 2431 (2018) (reviewing JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR
OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)) (noting that research shows that
“[r]elative to whites, blacks distrust police and believe that officers discriminate on the basis of
race”). Demographic differences in attitudes about law enforcement use of genetic information
is a fertile avenue for further research.
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down, and the latter two were viewed as on par with a roadblock in
terms of intrusiveness. Further, for all of these latter scenarios, well
under 50 percent of our participants answered “yes” when asked
whether the action infringed a reasonable expectation of privacy. Since
DNA is a constant in all of these situations, something else besides the
nature of the information being sought is motivating these
conclusions—a topic taken up in Part IV.
B. Experimental Manipulations
As detailed above, we developed several variations of the baseline
survey: a first-person variation (“police looking for your data” rather
than “police looking for a person’s data”), a serious-crime variation, a
crime-prevention variation, and a hindsight-bias variation. We
expected the first variation to produce higher intrusiveness ratings and
the other three to produce lower intrusiveness ratings, compared to the
baseline scenario. However, with the exception of our first prediction,
our hypotheses were not borne out.
With respect to the first-person condition, we observed
statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) increases in the mean intrusiveness of
fourteen out of twenty-one scenarios, a significant decrease in one
scenario,203 and no change in six scenarios.204 For a subset of scenarios,
respondents were also more likely to believe that a reasonable
expectation existed when given the first-person perspective; compared
to the baseline/third-person condition, we observed statistically
significant increases in nine out of twenty-one scenarios, while twelve
remained unchanged.205 As others have noted, this finding that the
first-person perspective increases intrusiveness ratings could help
explain the current narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s
threshold, to the extent judges gauge expectations of privacy from a
third-person rather than a first-person perspective.206
The findings from the other surveys were less conclusive. We did
not observe a statistically significant change in the perceived
203. We observed a statistically significant decrease in the mean intrusiveness rating for the
police roadblock scenario.
204. The six scenarios without statistically significant differences (p > 0.05) were familial
searches of public database, obtaining DNA from a DTC-GT company, creation of a universal
forensic database, creation of a universal fingerprint DB, pat down, and compelled collection of
DNA from arrestees. See infra Table 2.
205. See infra Table 2.
206. See, e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 177, at 760.
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intrusiveness of any of the scenarios when participants were instructed
that police were “looking for evidence that could help solve a serious
crime (such as murder, sexual assault, or terrorism)” as opposed to
simply “looking for evidence of some type of criminal activity.”207 Nor
did we find noticeable changes in perceived intrusiveness or privacy
expectations in the prevention condition or the hindsight-bias
condition.208 The most likely explanation for these null findings is that
the participants in each survey used the full 0–100 scale in rating
intrusiveness, regardless of their assigned condition. Thus, participants
asked to assess the intrusiveness of police efforts to find evidence in a
doctor’s office ranked that scenario at the high end of the scale whether
police were looking for evidence of serious crime, were trying to
prevent one, or actually found it. Our between-subjects design did not
ask participants to compare intrusiveness under these various
conditions, but rather held the relevant condition constant for each of
the twenty-one scenarios. This aspect of the methodology turned out
to be a poor test of our hypotheses about the impact of the seriouscrime, crime-prevention, and hindsight-bias variations.
At the same time, the lack of variation in mean intrusiveness
ratings also indicates that the hierarchy of scenarios remained
relatively constant between all four third-person surveys (we exclude
the first-person survey results here because, as reported above, that
methodology resulted in significantly higher intrusiveness ratings).
Only five scenarios changed more than two positions up or down in the
hierarchy over any of the four third-person survey variations, and no
scenario changed more than six positions.209 Further, these changes
were largely the result of very small changes in mean intrusiveness
ratings. For instance, the scenario involving the universal DNA
database was one of two that changed six positions, but its mean
intrusiveness rating only ranged between 68.6 and 73.5 among the four
survey variations. Similarly, the text message scenario—the only other
scenario that changed six positions—only ranged between 67.1 and
72.7.

207. See infra Appendix B (survey variations); Table 3 (results for “serious crime” variation).
208. See infra Tables 4–5. For the survey variations, see infra Appendix B.
209. See infra Tables 2–5.
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C. Summary of Results
Our most significant findings as they relate to law enforcement
efforts to use DNA for investigative purposes can be reduced to three.
First, our subjects saw significant differences in intrusiveness between
different types of DNA scenarios. Regardless of variation—thirdperson surveys versus first-person surveys versus type of police goal—
obtaining genetic information from an individual’s doctor was ranked
as the most intrusive or second most intrusive scenario. In all of the
conditions, creating or accessing arrestee databases, including where
familial matching was involved, was ranked among the bottom three
scenarios. And scenarios accessing public, DTC-GT, and research
databases were ranked in the middle of the pack, along with the
creation of a universal DNA database. Second, many types of law
enforcement DNA inquiries were equated with police actions that
clearly implicate the Fourth Amendment. Regardless of experimental
condition, accessing DNA in medical records and accessing public,
DTC-GT, and research databases were considered to be as intrusive as
or more intrusive than searches of bedrooms, texts, emails, and cellsite location data, all of which are searches under the Fourth
Amendment requiring probable cause.210 Third, however, some types
of DNA investigations were rated similarly to police investigative
techniques that do not require probable cause. Surreptitious collection
of DNA and creation of and access to arrestee databases were all seen
as less intrusive than a pat down, which only requires reasonable
suspicion,211 and accessing forensic databases was seen as less intrusive
than seizures at a roadblock, which the Court has held requires
reasonable suspicion if aimed at “ordinary crime control.”212 If
replicated, these findings have significant implications for Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
Our findings suggest that, to the extent current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence fails to regulate, or only minimally
regulates, genetically focused police investigations, it ignores societal
views about privacy, improperly so in our view. In particular, current

210. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
211. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
212. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44, 48 (2000).
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jurisprudence fails to recognize how important the situs of genetic
information is in influencing our participants’ privacy expectations.
Earlier, we noted the distinction between suspect-driven investigations
and profile-driven investigations.213 We explore the implications of our
findings under those two categories.
A. Suspect-Driven Investigations
Assume the police have a named suspect and want to obtain his or
her DNA to see if it matches crime scene DNA. There are at least three
ways they can accomplish this: requesting or compelling a sample from
the suspect; obtaining a sample or profile from another source; or
surreptitiously collecting a DNA sample.
1. Compulsion. We did not include in our study a scenario that
directly tested this situation. As we noted earlier, this type of action
would almost certainly require the police to obtain a warrant if the
person has not yet been arrested.214 We did include a scenario involving
taking a DNA sample from an arrested individual, as in King.
However, this scenario was framed as part of a routine “booking”
procedure aimed at all arrestees in an effort to populate a forensic
database, not as an investigation of a particular suspect. Thus, that
scenario is discussed below in connection with collection of DNA for
the purpose of creating a database profile.
2. Third-Party Access. A second way the police can attempt to
obtain the DNA of a named suspect is to go to a third-party source—
the person’s doctor, a public database, or a private database such as
those maintained by health care providers, researchers, or DTC-GT
companies. Under the Supreme Court’s current third-party doctrine,
none of these situations involves a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.215 Consistent with all of the related research in this area,216

213. See supra Part I.B.7.
214. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Part I.A.2.
216. See, e.g., Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy
Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 49–58
(2015) (“Participants in this study felt entitled to high levels of privacy in their digital information,
including information . . . covered by the third party doctrine.”); cf. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera
Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of
Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 341, 344–54 (2009) (“[E]mpirical research on consent and
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however, our survey participants do not agree with the third-party
doctrine’s application in these types of cases. Police access to a
suspect’s medical records—as well as to a suspect’s financial records—
are considered to be more intrusive than a search of a bedroom, which
requires a warrant and probable cause. In evaluating intrusiveness, our
survey participants appeared to focus not on the risks assumed (real or
imagined) when information is given to third parties, but rather on the
nature or situs of the information involved—or perhaps both. If our
other results, analyzed below, are any indication, the situs of the
information—that is, where the information is—appears to be the key
consideration.
3. Surreptitious Collection and Analysis. A third way the police
can obtain the DNA of a named suspect is through obtaining an item
discarded by the suspect. Here, the most applicable Supreme Court
doctrine has to do with abandoned property, as in cases involving
police examination of garbage left at curbside or seizure of items left
out in “open fields” that are privately owned but outside the home’s
curtilage, all of which hold that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply.217 The Court has also made clear that even information that is
not abandoned is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment if it is
“knowingly exposed” to the public.218
One could make the argument that, unlike the items seized or the
activities viewed in those cases, discarded DNA is not “voluntarily”
abandoned or “knowingly” exposed.219 One could also make the
argument, based on the results in Carpenter (which involved the seizure
perceptions or expectations of privacy . . . suggest[s] that lay perceptions in fact differ from
Supreme Court doctrine—at times substantially.”).
217. See supra Part I.A.1. Some state courts have reached different conclusions. See, e.g., State
v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276–77 (Haw. 1985) (“People reasonably believe that police will not
indiscriminately rummage through their trash bags to discover their personal effects.”); State v.
Goss, 834 A.2d 316, 319 (N.H. 2003) (holding there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in
black plastic trash bags on driveways when set “out for regular collection”); State v. Morris, 680
A.2d 90, 96 (Vt. 1996) (“[P]eople reasonably expect that, once their refuse is placed on the curb
in the customary and accepted manner, it will be collected, taken to the landfill, and commingled
with other garbage without being intercepted and examined by the police.”); State v. Hempele,
576 A.2d 793, 810 (N.J. 1990) (“Questions of ‘abandonment’ and property law do not defeat an
expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb for collection . . . . A person has as much right
to privacy in items concealed in a garbage bag as in items concealed in other opaque containers.”).
218. See supra Part I.A.1.
219. Scherr, supra note 172, at 465–68; Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The
Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 867 (2006).
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of 129 days of location data)220 and Jones (where the Court held that
GPS tracking of a car for 28 days is a search),221 that even information
that is knowingly exposed to the public is protected by the Fourth
Amendment if its quantity or quality make it particularly revealing.
But our survey participants did not seem to be attentive to these issues;
rather, they ranked the scenario in which DNA is taken from a
discarded item as among the least intrusive, presumably based on the
idea that the DNA has been discarded and is found in a public space.
The location of the genetic information, not its nature, appears to be
the most important consideration.
B. Profile-Driven Investigations
Now assume the police do not have a suspect but rather a DNA
profile taken from a crime scene. Here, law enforcement would like to
match the profile to profiles in a database. The implications of our
results for this purpose are best considered in connection with the four
types of DNA databases we studied: government-run databases; public
databases (such as GEDmatch); private databases (primarily DTC-GT
companies) and research-based databases (such as AoU). For each
type of database, one can ask: Under what circumstances may a DNA
sample be obtained and analyzed to create a profile (the collection
question), and when can the DNA that has been collected and profiled
be accessed by law enforcement (the access question)? The answers to
these questions turn out to be quite different depending on the type of
database; more specifically, again, the answers depend on where the
DNA is located.
1. Government-Run Databases. From a doctrinal point of view,
the collection question for government-run databases is partially
answered by King. Given the emphasis in that case on the lessened
privacy interests of jailed individuals,222 the Court is very likely to hold
that taking DNA samples from the general, unincarcerated population
is impermissible absent a very significant justification.223 At the same

220. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
221. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403–04 (2012).
222. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
223. A stance that calls into question the holding in King itself, since the justification for
obtaining the DNA of arrestees who are not yet convicted is weak unless first-time arrestees are
more likely to commit crime than the general population. Cf. J.W. Hazel, E.W. Clayton, B.A.
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time, King clearly held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by
a statute that authorizes jail personnel, acting in the absence of
probable cause, to collect DNA samples from people arrested for
felonies (and presumably from people convicted of felonies as well)
and then profile them.224 The Court left open the possibility that a
statute permitting collection of DNA from persons arrested for minor
crimes would not be constitutional,225 but it is unlikely to so hold.226
As to when the government can access the DNA it has collected,
King indicated law enforcement agencies may do so any time they want
to identify an arrestee, as well as any time they have crime scene DNA
they think might match a profile in the database.227 But the Court also
made clear that the government cannot access the DNA to discover
medical information and the like. The Court emphasized that “the
CODIS loci come from noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal
the genetic traits of the arrestee,” that “even if non-coding alleles could
provide some information, they are not in fact tested for that end,” and
that the statute ensures that “[n]o purpose other than identification is
permissible.”228
Our survey data are broadly consistent with this actual and
predicted case law. Our participants viewed both government creation
of an arrestee-based database and government access to that
database—whether directly or through familial matching—as similar in
intrusiveness to a roadblock and much less intrusive than a pat down,
neither of which require a warrant or probable cause.229 In contrast,
Malin & C. Slobogin, Is It Time for a Universal Genetic Forensic Database?, 362 SCI. 898, 899
(2018) (describing the discriminatory impact of current testing practices).
224. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
225. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013) (describing the holding in the context of
“an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense” (emphasis added)); id. at
480 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s holding will result in the dumping of a large number of
arrestee samples—many from minor offenders—onto an already overburdened system . . . .”).
226. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 322, 339 (2012) (allowing body
cavity searches of individuals arrested for minor crimes, even in the absence of any suspicion of
contraband, because the record lacked “substantial evidence showing the[] policies are an
unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security”).
227. King, 569 U.S. at 464 (“[T]he processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s 13 CODIS loci
did not intrude on respondent’s privacy in a way that would make his DNA identification
unconstitutional.”).
228. Id. at 464–65. The Maryland statute states, “a person may not willfully test a DNA sample
for information that does not relate to the identification of individuals as specified in this subtitle.”
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-512(c) (LexisNexis 2018).
229. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
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creation of and access to a universal database, which of course would
include everyone—not just those suspected of or arrested for a crime—
was considered to be at least as intrusive as a patdown, perhaps because
our participants believed that their own DNA is much more likely to
be in such a database.
At the same time, the universal database was considered
somewhat less intrusive than police access to more selective databases
such as those maintained by DTC-GT companies (especially in the
first-person scenario, described in Appendix D), even though the
participants’ DNA is less likely to be found in the latter location. This
distinction suggests that the survey participants are more willing to
permit access to a database in which everyone must submit their DNA
for the express purpose of assisting law enforcement (the universal
database) than to a DTC-GT database that is created for other reasons,
that is not mandatory, and that does not include everyone.230 Again,
the situs of the information, rather than the information itself or
whether it is voluntarily surrendered, seems to be the driving factor in
the intrusiveness ratings.
2. Public Databases. The collection question here is easily
answered as a doctrinal matter. Collection by public databases like
GEDmatch is clearly not governed by the Fourth Amendment,
because the DNA is not sought by the government and is submitted
voluntarily. Traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine would also
permit access to this database, whether openly or through deception,
because in either case the consumer has voluntarily surrendered the
information to a third party.
Even after Carpenter, that may remain the outcome. Again,
Carpenter gave two basic reasons for its holding. First, as we noted
earlier, the Court stated that “[t]here is a world of difference between
the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller
and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected
by wireless carriers today.”231 If all the police learn from a company
like GEDmatch are the names of matches or partial matches to a crime
scene sample, that information is hardly “exhaustive.” Admittedly, if
the police do not obtain a direct match but only several partial matches

230. Cf. Hazel et al., supra note 223, at 899 (“[A] universal database would eliminate or reduce
problems associated with the current haphazard genetic investigative regime.”).
231. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
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and ostentatiously track down each of them, unsought information may
be exposed. Most obviously, people who use these services may find
out about a relative—say, a half-sibling who is a serial killer—who they
would rather never have discovered.232 But that should be all that they
discover. Recall that in King the Court was willing to assume that, even
if law enforcement agencies obtain a complete DNA sample, much less
a profile of the sample, they can be counted on to limit themselves to
identification and crime-scene matching, and not use the genetic
material for other purposes or to reveal information to other parties
unnecessarily.233 Illustrating that stance, the 2019 DOJ Interim Policy
provides that all profiles and related account information “shall be
treated as confidential,” that genetic testing services should remove
genetic information submitted by law enforcement after arrest of a
suspect, and that these materials may not be used “to determine the
sample donor’s genetic predisposition for disease or any other medical
condition or psychological trait.”234
The second reason Carpenter gave for its decision is even less
applicable in this setting. The reason is worth quoting in full:
Cell phone location information is not truly “shared” as one normally
understands the term . . . . [C]ell phones and the services they provide
are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that carrying one
is indispensable to participation in modern society . . . . Apart from
disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid
leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no meaningful
sense does the user voluntarily “assume[] the risk” of turning over a
comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.235

DNA samples surrendered to a public database, in contrast, are
“truly ‘shared,’” because the services GEDmatch provide are not
“indispensable to participation in modern society”;236 rather, the
consumer can forgo sharing the information without significant
hardship. Of course, the partial matches might lead police to people

232. See, e.g., George Doe, With Genetic Testing, I Gave My Parents the Gift of Divorce, VOX
(Sept. 9, 2014, 7:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/9/9/5975653/with-genetic-testing-i-gave-myparents-the-gift-of-divorce-23andme [https://perma.cc/4LMP-BSF2].
233. See King, 569 U.S. at 464.
234. DOJ INTERIM POLICY, supra note 151, at 6–7.
235. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (first quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014);
then quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)).
236. Cf. id.
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who have never even considered submitting their DNA to a database
and who may now be subjected to police interviews or attempts to
collect their DNA, surreptitiously or through other means.237 But note
that, once the police obtain the name of a partial match, old-fashioned
legwork could usually create the same family tree a database company
might provide, and that once police get a name, the rules governing
police efforts to collect the DNA of these relatives, overtly or covertly,
are no different than if access to the database had never occurred. The
important fact for third-party doctrine purposes would seem to be that
the DNA in the database was voluntarily submitted, which undercuts
Carpenter’s importance in this context.
Yet our survey participants viewed the scenario based on the use
of GEDmatch in the GSK case to be more intrusive than government
access to the cell-site location data at issue in Carpenter,238 suggesting
that they do not consider the voluntariness of the interaction with the
third party to be relevant. In contrast, recall that the familial matching
scenario in our survey involved a forensic database, which obtains
samples involuntarily, was rated toward the bottom of the intrusiveness
hierarchy, even though concerns about undiscovered relatives of the
type discussed above are equally apposite there. Thus, in evaluating
the GEDmatch-type scenario, our participants seemed to be focused
on the type of database at issue and perhaps also the fact that the police
are engaging in deception in obtaining the match—a concern the new
DOJ policy, which generally bars the type of police action used in the
GSK case,239 appears to endorse. To our subjects, those criteria appear
to be more relevant to privacy interests than whether information is

237. See supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text.
238. Technically, cell-site location data might be less precise than cell-phone location data
using GPS signals. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (noting that the cell-site data only “placed
[the subject] within a wedge-shaped sector ranging from one-eighth to four square miles”);
Douglas Starr, What Your Cell Phone Can’t Tell the Police, NEW YORKER (June 26, 2014), https:/
/www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-your-cell-phone-cant-tell-the-police [https://perma.
cc/JLH8-NY8B] (describing the uncertainties of cell-site location data). Our survey referred to
“cell-phone location data from the[] cell phone company,” infra Appendix A, which, although
accurately describing the cell-site location data in Carpenter, could also be influenced by
participants’ familiarity with the pinpoint accuracy of GPS location data, cf. J. Clement, Most
Popular Mapping Apps in the United States as of April 2018, by Monthly Users, STATISTICA (Nov.
20, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/865413/most-popular-us-mapping-apps-ranked-byaudience [https://perma.cc/9FRY-LJPW] (reporting over 220 million monthly users of iOS
mapping apps in the United States alone).
239. DOJ INTERIM POLICY, supra note 151, at 6.
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voluntarily shared with a third party or whether a police investigation
might expose a family tree.
3. Private Databases. The collection question here is again easily
answered because the government is not involved at this stage. The
access question is harder to answer as a doctrinal matter, however.
Unlike with public databases, the average consumer assumes the DNA
sample and the profile will be kept private, at least in identified form,
unless and until the consumer decides to reveal it.240 At the same time,
Carpenter suggests that such access is not a search because, as with the
public database scenario, providing one’s DNA sample to a DTC-GT
company is not a crucial aspect of participating in society.
Again, however, our survey participants do not appear to care
about this latter point. They rate government access to DTC-GT
databases as more intrusive than fraudulent access to a public database
and on a par with access to bedrooms and emails, which requires a
warrant, as well as on a par with access to financial records, which
arguably should require one. Here, the private nature of the database
produces a result that suggests the Fourth Amendment is implicated in
full force.
4. Research-Oriented Databases. Research databases may be
maintained by a variety of third parties, such as health care providers,
researchers, or DTC-GT companies. The collection issue here is
muddied to some extent if the government is sponsoring the collection,
as occurs with the AoU Research Program. But the collection is still
voluntary and is not for law enforcement purposes, so the Fourth
Amendment probably would not apply. Nor would it likely govern
police access to research-based databases, since once again, the
information is voluntarily surrendered in the sense meant by
Carpenter. But here, it is the government that is guaranteeing that the
genetic information will be used only for a specific, non-law
enforcement purpose, which might give courts more pause.
In any event, our participants viewed accessing this type of
database as similar in intrusiveness to police accessing public and

240. See Emily Christofides & Kieran O’Doherty, Company Disclosure and Consumer
Perceptions of the Privacy Implications of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 35 NEW GENETICS
& SOC’Y 101, 114–16 (2016) (reporting on a survey of consumers of DTC-GT designed to evaluate
their understanding of privacy information and expected uses of information and samples).
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private databases and as more intrusive than accessing a governmentrun database. Again, the type of database, not its precise contents,
seems to be driving the results.
CONCLUSION
Overall, our findings suggest that members of society asked to
differentiate government attempts to obtain genetic information use
different metrics than the courts. At least when DNA is accessed solely
for the purpose of matching a person with a crime, the extent to which
people associate genetic information with privacy significantly depends
on where it is located, not its content or whether it was “voluntarily”
surrendered. Thus, according to our results, DNA given to one’s doctor
for analysis is more closely associated with privacy than DNA given to
a publicly accessible genealogy service, a private DTC-GT company,
or a government-sponsored research entity. And, from the perspective
of our survey participants, all of these scenarios are more entitled to
privacy than the DNA involuntarily provided to an arrestee-based
database or unknowingly discarded DNA found in public. Similarly,
our findings suggest that when DNA is maintained in places akin to the
home, it is entitled to maximum privacy protection. Specifically, when
DNA is found in a doctor’s office or a private or public database, police
access to it is perceived to be similar in intrusiveness to searches of
bedrooms, emails, and texts.241 Those outcomes are consonant with
Justice John Marshall Harlan’s observation in Katz that although “‘the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places[,]’ . . . what protection
it affords to those people generally “requires reference to a ‘place.’”242
Yet, despite our findings, at present none of these genetic storage
places are clearly protected against government access by the Fourth
Amendment, much less the warrant requirement. We think the Court
should reconsider that position. Our results, if replicated, suggest that
contrary to the dictates of the third-party doctrine, the Fourth
Amendment should govern whenever law enforcement seeks access to
genetic information held in medical records or in private, public, or
research genetic databases. Further, given that searches of bedrooms,
emails, and texts require a warrant, a warrant should be required for
241. See, e.g., supra Table 1 (ranking searches of bedrooms, text messages, DNA databases,
and emails within a spread of 2 points on a 100-point scale).
242. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting id.
at 351 (majority opinion)).
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these types of government searches as well, whether conducted overtly
or covertly.243
Such a warrant would not be easy to obtain under traditional rules
requiring probable cause to believe evidence will be found in a
particularized location.244 Police would have to make two probable
cause showings: (1) that they have an identified suspect or the DNA of
a suspect from a crime scene; and (2) that the suspect’s DNA, or a full
or partial match to the crime scene DNA, will be discovered in the
targeted database.245 The first showing will usually be straightforward,
although problems can arise with respect to match inquiries if police
cannot clearly show that the crime-scene DNA comes from the
perpetrator. The second showing will be much more difficult, given the
likelihood police will have no idea which, if any, databases might
contain the DNA of the suspect or a family member. However, such a
showing might be possible if, based on the type of research we
described earlier, the Court is willing to find that probable cause exists
because, given the size of many of the databases that law enforcement
is likely to target, there is a significant probability that virtually anyone
is likely to have at least one relative in the database.246
An analogy to this latter scenario comes from a recent judicial
development in the realm of electronic information called the “reverse
location warrant.” In the reverse warrants granted to date, police have
successfully compelled telecommunications companies to disclose celllocation information about all phones near a crime scene at the time
the crime occurred—information which then might be used to track
down suspects or witnesses through various means, including warrantbased inquiries into their communications.247 The rationale for such

243. If one follows the results in Table 1 regarding forensic databases, a warrant might also
be required for government access to its own databases, the content of which should be limited to
collection of DNA from those arrested for serious crimes.
244. See generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS ch. 5 (7th ed. 2020) (describing the
probable cause and particularity requirements of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment).
245. The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to believe that the items sought will be
found in the place to be searched. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214 n.7 (1981)
(“[A]bsent exigent circumstances the magistrate, rather than the police officer, must make the
decision that probable cause exists to believe that the person or object to be seized is within a
particular place.”).
246. See Erlich et al., supra note 17, at 690.
247. See, e.g., Aaron Mak, Close Enough, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2019, 5:55 AM), https://slate.com/
technology/2019/02/reverse-location-search-warrants-google-police.html [https://perma.cc/JZ5S-
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authorizations is that only one fact about the individuals identified in
this manner is discovered: where they were at a particular time.248
Warrants limiting police to familial searches using public and private
databases might be justified on similar grounds, since all that will be
discovered is a match or partial genetic match. Given the smaller
number and large size of common carriers, the probability that a
particular communications company will have the relevant information
may be higher in the reverse-warrant situation than in the genetic
setting. But as DTC-GT and public databases grow and familial
matching techniques improve, that difference is decreasing.
Commentators have correctly raised concerns about the broad scope
of reverse cell-location warrants.249 But such a regime, applied to
genetic data and familial searches, would provide sufficiently more
oversight of these activities than the existing system.
Our research also suggests that the Fourth Amendment should
govern when the police obtain a partial match through the process just
described and then want to obtain the DNA of relatives of the partial
match covertly rather than consensually. As indicated in Table 1, our
subjects ranked covert collection as relatively low in intrusiveness,
which suggests a traditional warrant should not be required in this
situation. However, this scenario was still routinely ranked as more
intrusive than a roadblock, which requires some sort of suspicion when
it is aimed at detecting ordinary crime. As applied to covert DNA
collection, this reasoning suggests that, before engaging in covert DNA
collection, police should have to explain to a judge—ideally, before the
collection takes place—how they have narrowed the pool of relatives
from whom DNA is sought and why there is good reason to believe
that those who remain in the pool could be a direct match. The
Supreme Court case most on point in this regard is Illinois v. Lidster,250
which upheld a roadblock established at the same time and place as a
CFN3]. For a review of cases that have addressed this issue, see generally Donna Lee Elm,
Geofence Warrants: Challenging Digital Dragnets, 35 CRIM. JUST. 7 (2020).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, No. 18-CR-37, 2020 WL 4065980, at *8 (E.D.N.C. July
20, 2020) (“[T]he privacy concerns underpinning the court’s holding in Carpenter do not come
into play . . . where the search for data focuses not on ‘the whole of [an individual’s] physical
movements’ but rather on the data that was left behind at a particular time and place by virtue of
cell phone tower locations.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018))).
249. See Elm, supra note 247, at 9–12; Daniel K. Gelb, Is the Reverse Location Search Warrant
Heading in the Wrong Direction?, 34 CRIM. JUST. 68 passim (2019).
250. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
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hit-and-run accident that occurred a week earlier, in an effort to
identify eyewitnesses to, or the perpetrator of, the accident.251 The
Court stated that the analysis in such cases should consider “the gravity
of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty.”252 A formulation along these lines
should also govern covert DNA collection if the results of our study
are given weight in the analysis.
One might disparage this suggested regulatory regime on the
grounds that survey results, even if solidly representative of public
views, are not relevant to Fourth Amendment questions, and that a
balancing analysis, property law, or some other judicial metric should
dictate the amendment’s scope.253 But there are several reasons to
reject this view, the first two of which were noted earlier.254 First, the
Supreme Court’s own formulation of the Fourth Amendment’s scope
references expectations of privacy “recognized by society.” The plain
meaning of this language calls for an assessment of the public’s views.
Second, privacy is ultimately dependent on societal mores, which can
only be ascertained through some sort of empirical assessment. Indeed,
survey results, with all of their flaws, can provide stability to an area of
the law that, to date, has relied mostly on judicial intuitions about
privacy or property.255
Third, there are real-world effects of a Fourth Amendment regime
that ignores the public’s views. As Kugler and Strahilevitz have pointed
out:
When there is a sharp divide between what the courts describe as the
Fourth Amendment’s scope and what the people actually expect the
Fourth Amendment’s scope to be, various problems arise. Lawabiding people may take excessive precautions to protect their
251. Id. at 427–28.
252. Id. at 427 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
253. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 503 (2007) (describing both normative and descriptive models of Fourth Amendment
protection).
254. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
255. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he only thing
the past three decades have established about the Katz test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, those ‘actual
(subjective) expectation[s] of privacy’ ‘that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable”’ bear
an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))).

SLOBOGIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/16/2020 12:52 AM

762

[Vol. 70:705

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

information, keeping it not only from the state’s agents but also from
third parties who could put the information to productive uses. Or
citizens might make inordinate investments in learning the contours
of Fourth Amendment law, time and money that could be better
spent elsewhere. Also, mistaken expectations limit the effectiveness
of the democratic process as a check on law enforcement surveillance;
the public may not move legislatively to protect privacy if they
mistakenly believe it is already protected constitutionally.
Disconnects between actual law and perceived law may also provide
police officers and prosecutors with undue leverage over citizens.256

Finally, if the courts depart substantially from societal mores, their
own legitimacy—not just the legitimacy of the practices they
condone—could suffer.257 Carpenter seemed to recognize that
possibility: “Critically, because location information is continually
logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just
those belonging to persons who might happen to come under
investigation—this newfound tracking capacity runs against
everyone.”258 Today, with the combination of government, private, and
public DNA databases now in existence, the government’s “newfound
tracking capacity” to identify people’s genetic markers “runs against
[almost] everyone.”259 Recall the hypothetical that began this Article.
If the Justices announced that the third-party or knowing-exposure
doctrines applied to every step the police in that case took to obtain
DNA—in effect, shielding these activities from Fourth Amendment
scrutiny—the Court would likely do serious damage to its prestige and
authority. Research like that reported in this Article can help the
courts gauge how far they should go in contracting or expanding Fourth
Amendment rights.

256. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 194, at 227 (footnote omitted).
257. SLOBOGIN, supra note 41, at 116; see also Heather Murphy, Playing Catch a Killer with a
Room Full of Sleuths, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2VdgOG7 [https://perma.cc/
8M7A-KBZ6] (quoting Diahan Southard, an instructor at a program training law enforcement
officers about genetic searches, as warning that continued availability of such searches “depends
on having the support of regular people . . . . If you can’t convince the public that it’s safe, it’s
going to go away”).
258. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
259. Cf. id.
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APPENDIX A: FULL TEXT OF STUDY SCENARIOS
Genetic Data Focused

Search for Suspect
in Forensic DNA
DB

Police searching a law enforcement DNA
database that contains the DNA profiles of
people who have been arrested: they want to
see if they can find a match between an
unknown DNA sample and a person in the
database.

Familial Search of
Forensic DNA DB

Police uploading a person’s DNA profile
(found at a crime scene) to a law
enforcement database that contains the DNA
profiles of people who have been arrested, in
the hope that they will find a match with
either the person or one of their relatives
who can help identify them.

Compelled DNA
Collection from
Arrestees

Police collecting a DNA sample from a
person after they have been arrested for a
crime as part of the normal “booking”
process.

Collection for a
Universal DNA
DB

Police collecting a DNA sample from
everyone, at birth or upon entry to the
country as a visitor, to create a nationwide
law enforcement database.

Genetic Data from
DTC-GT
Company

Police getting a person’s DNA profile from a
genetic testing company (for example,
Ancestry.com or 23andMe) that the person
had used in the past.

Genetic Data from
Doctor

Police getting a person’s DNA profile from
their doctor.

Genetic Data from
Researchers

Police getting a person’s DNA profile from a
research study that the person had been a
part of.
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Familial Search of
Public Genealogy
DNA DB

A police officer uploading a person’s DNA
profile (found at a crime scene) to a publicly
accessible genealogy DNA database,
pretending the DNA is theirs, in the hope
that they will find a match with either the
person or with a relative of the person who
can help identify them.

Surreptitious
Collection of
Discarded DNA

Police collecting an item that a person has
thrown away, like a used soda can or
cigarette, and creating a DNA profile from it.
Other Data Types and Searches

Medical Records

Police getting a person’s medical records
from their doctor.

Text Messages

Police looking at all of the text messages that
a person has sent or received on their phone.

Emails

Police looking at all of the emails that a
person has sent or received on their
computer.

Phone Numbers

Police getting a list of all the phone numbers
that a person has received calls from or
placed calls to from their telephone company.

Social Media

Police looking at a person’s social media
profile and posts (for example, on
Facebook); the profile and posts are not
visible to the public.

Web History

Police getting a list of all the websites that a
person has visited from their internet service
provider.

Cell Location

Police getting a person’s cell phone location
data from their cell phone company.

Financial Records

Police getting a person’s financial records
from their bank.
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Universal
Fingerprint DB

Police collecting the fingerprints of everyone
to create a nationwide law enforcement
database.

Bedroom Search

Police searching a person’s bedroom.

Pat Down

Police patting-down a person’s clothing
during a brief stop.

Roadblock

Police stopping people at a roadblock.

APPENDIX B: SURVEY VARIATIONS
(EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS)
Third Person (Baseline Survey):
In the baseline survey, participants were given the following
instructions and assumptions:
Instructions:
You will be presented with 21 scenarios involving actions by police.
Assume in each scenario that:
1) the police are looking for evidence of some type of criminal
activity; but that
2) the person is presumed innocent of any criminal wrongdoing;
and that
3) the person did not consent to the police action.
First-Person Variation:
• Assumptions 2 & 3 were modified to read: “2) you are
presumed innocent of any criminal wrongdoing; and “3) you
did not consent to the police action”.
• All 21 scenarios were presented in the first person (e.g. “police
obtaining your DNA profile . . .” as opposed to “a person’s
DNA profile . . .”).
Serious-Crime Variation:
• Assumption 1 was modified to read: “the police are looking for
evidence that could help solve a serious crime that has been
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committed (such as murder, sexual assault, or terrorism); but
that . . .”
Prevent-Serious-Crime Variation:
• Assumption 1 was modified to read: “the police are looking for
evidence that could help prevent a serious crime from being
committed (such as murder, sexual assault, or terrorism); but
that . . .”
Hindsight-Bias Variation:
• As in the Serious Crime variation, Assumption 1 was modified
to read: “the police are looking for evidence that could help
solve a serious crime that has been committed (such as murder,
sexual assault, or terrorism); but that . . .”
• The following additional Assumption was also added after
Assumption 1: “the police found evidence of criminal activity
by the person; but that . . .”

APPENDIX C: DEMOGRAPHICS OF STUDY POPULATION
Demographic

Group

n

%

Race

American Indian or Alaska
Native

22

1.4%

Asian

79

4.9%

180

11.3%

Middle Eastern or North
African

1

0.1%

Native Hawaiian or other
Pacific Islander

1

0.1%

1257

78.7%

None of these fully describe
me

39

2.4%

Prefer not to answer/No
response

18

1.1%

Black or African American

White
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Hispanic,
Latino, or
Spanish Origin

Yes

172

10.8%

No

1391

87.5%

34

1.7%

Female

735

46.0%

Male

845

52.9%

6

0.4%

11

0.7%

Single

738

46.2%

Married

723

45.3%

Divorced

95

5.9%

Separated

23

1.4%

Prefer not to answer/No
response

18

1.1%

18 to 29

450

28.2%

30 to 44

770

48.2%

45 to 59

269

16.8%

60 and over

63

3.9%

Prefer not to answer/No
response

45

2.8%

1363

85.3%

48

3.0%

152

9.5%

12

0.8%

Prefer not to answer/No
response
Gender

Other/Prefer to self-describe
Prefer not to answer/No
response
Marital Status

Age

Sexual
Orientation

767

Straight/Heterosexual
Gay or Lesbian
Bisexual
Other/Prefer to self-describe
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Prefer not to answer/No
response

Education

22

1.4%

3

0.2%

High school graduate, GED

165

10.3%

Some college credit, no degree

327

20.5%

61

3.8%

Associate degree

195

12.2%

Bachelor’s degree

648

40.6%

Graduate or Professional
degree

186

11.6%

Prefer not to answer/No
response

12

0.8%

Less than $20,000

255

16.0%

$20,000 to $34,999

314

19.7%

$35,000 to $49,999

321

20.1%

$50,000 to $74,999

368

23.0%

$75,000 to $99,999

180

11.3%

$100,000 to $149,999

88

5.5%

$150,000 to $199,999

22

1.4%

$200,000 or more

12

0.8%

Prefer not to answer/No
response

37

2.3%

Republican

322

20.2%

Leans Republican

137

8.6%

Independent

350

21.9%

Less than a high school degree

Trade/technical/vocational
training

Income

Political
Affiliation
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Leans Democrat

250

15.7%

Democrat

508

31.8%

30

1.9%

All positive

362

22.7%

Mostly positive

629

39.4%

Both positive and negative

354

22.2%

Mostly negative

122

7.6%

All negative

30

1.9%

No previous interactions

78

4.9%

Prefer not to answer/No
response

22

1.4%

High crime neighborhood

42

2.6%

316

19.8%

1148

71.9%

I don’t know

69

4.3%

Prefer not to answer/No
response

22

1.4%

Doctor-Ordered

143

9.0%

Direct-to-Consumer

185

11.6%

For Research

92

5.8%

Unsure

75

4.7%

1177

73.7%

58

3.6%

Prefer not to answer/No
response
Interactions
with Law
Enforcement

Type of
Neighborhood

Moderate crime neighborhood
Low crime neighborhood

Previous
Genetic
Testing?
(check all that
apply)

769

No
Prefer not to answer/No
response
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APPENDIX D: EFFECT OF EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS
TABLE 2: FIRST PERSON SURVEY VARIATION: INTRUSIVENESS AND
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY FOR 21 SCENARIOS
Perspective: 1st Person (n = 313)
#

Scenario:
*†

Intrusiveness

REP?

Mean

Z

S.D.

% Yes

1

Bedroom Search

83.2

± 2.2

19.9

82.1%

2

Genetic Data from Doctor*

82.0

± 2.4

21.8

89.1%

3

Text Messages*

80.7

± 2.1

19.2

81.5%

4

Medical Records*†

80.4

± 2.5

22.9

88.8%

5

Emails*†

79.3

± 2.3

20.4

84.7%

6

Financial Records*†

77.8

± 2.4

21.8

84.0%

75.3

± 2.9

25.8

82.7%

74.8

± 2.9

25.8

82.7%

7
8

Genetic Data from DTC-GT
Company†
Genetic Data from
Researchers*

9

Web History*†

74.1

± 2.5

22.7

79.6%

10

Familial Search of Public
Genealogy DNA DB†

74.0

± 3.1

27.8

77.6%

11

Phone Numbers*

70.0

± 2.6

23.2

75.1%

12

Cell Location*

69.0

± 2.7

24.2

69.3%

13

Collection for a Universal
DNA DB

68.6

± 3.3

30.1

69.0%

14

Social Media*†

68.5

± 2.9

25.9

74.1%

15

Pat Down

59.1

± 3.1

27.7

40.9%

16

Universal Fingerprint DB

58.6

± 3.4

31.1

57.5%

57.1

± 3.3

29.6

49.2%

50.5

± 3.5

31.2

37.7%

49.1

± 3.3

29.9

43.5%

17
18
19

Surreptitious Collection of
Discarded DNA*
Compelled DNA Collection
from Arrestees
Familial Search of Forensic
DNA DB*†
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20

Search for Suspect in Forensic
DNA DB*

41.9

± 3.4

31.0

36.7%

21

Roadblock

35.2

± 2.9

26.0

20.1%

Symbols indicate scenarios where a statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) increase
in mean intrusiveness (*) and/or expectation of privacy (†) was observed when
compared to the baseline survey (Table 1).

TABLE 3: SERIOUS CRIME SURVEY VARIATION: INTRUSIVENESS AND
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY FOR 21 SCENARIOS
Serious Crime (n = 319)
#

Scenario:

1

Intrusiveness

REP?

Mean

Z

S.D.

% Yes

Genetic Data from Doctor

76.2

± 2.6

24.1

83.1%

2

Medical Records

73.5

± 2.6

23.3

85.6%

3

Collection for a Universal
DNA DB†

73.2

± 3.2

29.6

74.3%

4

Bedroom Search

72.8

± 2.5

22.6

71.2%

5

Familial Search of Public
Genealogy DNA DB

71.7

± 3.2

29.2

70.5%

6

Emails

70.8

± 2.5

23.2

71.2%

7

Genetic Data from DTC-GT
Company

70.6

± 2.9

26.7

77.1%

8

Financial Records

70.3

± 2.6

23.8

76.2%

9

Text Messages

70.2

± 2.5

23.2

74.9%

10

Genetic Data from
Researchers

69.6

± 2.9

26.9

74.6%

11

Web History

66.4

± 2.7

25.0

67.4%

12

Universal Fingerprint DB

64.9

± 3.5

32.1

63.6%

13

Phone Numbers

61.2

± 2.8

25.4

63.6%

14

Social Media

59.3

± 3.0

27.2

61.4%

15

Cell Location

59.0

± 2.8

25.9

61.8%

SLOBOGIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/16/2020 12:52 AM

772

[Vol. 70:705

16
17
18
19
20
21

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Pat Down
Compelled DNA Collection
from Arrestees
Surreptitious Collection of
Discarded DNA
Roadblock
Familial Search of Forensic
DNA DB
Search for Suspect in Forensic
DNA DB

52.9

± 3.0

27.2

40.4%

48.6

± 3.3

29.9

36.4%

47.7

± 3.4

30.7

40.1%

40.7

± 3.2

29.2

27.0%

39.4

± 3.5

32.0

30.1%

30.8

± 3.3

30.0

23.8%

Symbols indicate scenarios where a statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) increase
in mean intrusiveness (*) and/or expectation of privacy (†) was observed when
compared to the baseline survey (Table 1).

TABLE 4. PREVENTION OF SERIOUS CRIME SURVEY VARIATION:
INTRUSIVENESS AND EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY FOR 21 SCENARIOS
Objective: Prevent Serious Crime
(n = 318)
#

Scenario:

1

Intrusiveness

REP?

Mean

Z

S.D.

% Yes

Genetic Data from Doctor

78.8

± 2.6

23.2

84.3%

2

Medical Records

75.9

± 2.5

22.5

85.2%

3

Collection for a Universal
DNA DB

73.5

± 3.2

29.2

73.0%

4

Bedroom Search

72.0

± 2.8

25.8

76.7%

71.6

± 2.9

26.5

80.8%

70.6

± 3.2

29.3

73.0%

5
6

Genetic Data from DTC-GT
Company
Familial Search of Public
Genealogy DNA DB

7

Financial Records

70.6

± 2.6

23.7

79.6%

8

Genetic Data from
Researchers

70.1

± 2.9

26.8

79.9%

9

Emails†

70.0

± 2.7

24.6

78.6%

10

Text Messages

69.8

± 2.8

25.3

79.6%
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11

Web History†

67.2

± 2.8

25.3

75.8%

12

Phone Numbers†

63.2

± 2.7

24.2

72.3%

13

Universal Fingerprint DB

63.1

± 3.7

33.5

65.7%

14

Social Media

59.8

± 3.1

27.9

67.3%

15

Cell Location

58.7

± 3.0

26.9

68.6%

16

Pat Down

54.0

± 3.0

27.2

39.3%

48.8

± 3.5

31.8

36.2%

46.6

± 3.3

29.9

45.6%

40.1

± 3.4

30.5

26.1%

38.7

± 3.3

30.1

38.4%

31.8

± 3.3

29.7

31.4%

17
18
19
20
21

Compelled DNA Collection
from Arrestees
Surreptitious Collection of
Discarded DNA
Roadblock
Familial Search of Forensic
DNA DB†
Search for Suspect in Forensic
DNA DB†

Symbols indicate scenarios where a statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) increase
in mean intrusiveness (*) and/or expectation of privacy (†) was observed when
compared to the serious crime variation of the survey (Appendix D, Table 2).
TABLE 5. HINDSIGHT BIAS SURVEY VARIATION: INTRUSIVENESS AND
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY FOR 21 SCENARIOS.
Hindsight Bias (Evidence Found)
(n = 324)
#

Scenario:

1
2
3
4

Intrusiveness

REP?

Mean

Z

S.D.

% Yes

Genetic Data from Doctor

75.2

± 2.8

25.3

84.3%

Medical Records

73.6

± 2.6

23.7

81.2%

71.5

± 3.2

29.3

74.4%

70.2

± 3.1

28.5

72.5%

Collection for a Universal
DNA DB
Familial Search of Public
Genealogy DNA DB

5

Bedroom Search*

68.3

± 2.7

25.2

65.4%

6

Genetic Data from DTC-GT
Company

67.9

± 2.9

26.8

75.6%
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7

Financial Records

67.7

± 2.8

25.6

71.3%

8

Emails

67.4

± 2.7

24.5

67.9%

9

Text Messages†

67.1

± 2.7

25.1

67.6%

10

Genetic Data from
Researchers*

63.4

± 3.1

28.8

75.9%

11

Universal Fingerprint DB

63.3

± 3.5

32.3

64.5%

12

Web History*

61.9

± 2.9

27.0

61.1%

13

Phone Numbers

57.9

± 2.8

25.9

59.0%

14

Cell Location

57.6

± 2.9

26.7

56.8%

15

Social Media†

55.4

± 3.1

28.1

53.7%

16

Pat Down

54.8

± 3.0

27.8

41.7%

44.6

± 3.4

31.1

34.9%

43.8

± 3.1

28.9

37.3%

42.1

± 3.2

29.6

29.6%

38.2

± 3.3

30.6

30.2%

31.3

± 3.2

29.4

26.9%

17
18
19
20
21

Compelled DNA Collection
from Arrestees
Surreptitious Collection of
Discarded DNA
Roadblock
Familial Search of Forensic
DNA DB
Search for Suspect in Forensic
DNA DB

Symbols indicate scenarios where a statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) decrease
mean intrusiveness (*) and/or expectation of privacy (†) was observed when
compared to the serious crime variation of the survey (Appendix D, Table 2).

